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ABSTRACT
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND INDIRECT THIRD-PARTY CONFLICT 
INTERVENTION: A HYPOTHESIS FROM THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR 
Shishmanian, Haig Philip
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Özgür Özdamar  
February 2014
 Ethnically and religiously-identified groups are frequently involved in 
conflict. Such conflicts attract forms of third-party intervention which often 
favor one ethno-religious group over another by means other than direct 
military intervention on the part of the affiliated third-party government. This 
study first highlights two themes in two areas of literature: Studies of the role of 
religion in politics discuss types of religious grouping, understood generally as 
‘religious affiliation’, while conflict intervention literature suggests several 
forms of intervention apart from direct military intervention but lacks a detailed 
description of a variable encompassing all such forms. This variable is termed 
‘indirect intervention’, the definition of which, synthesized from the literature, 
is this thesis’ first contribution. This thesis also considers that, though 
contemporary international politics features religiously-affiliated third-parties 
indirectly aiding ‘brethren’ in conflict, a causal relationship between the two has 
previously only been postulated and should be explored. By carrying out a 
hypothesis-generating case study of religious affiliation and indirect 
intervention in the case of the Western support of the Maronite Arab 
community’s parties and militias during the Lebanese Civil War, it is 
 iii
hypothesized that religious affiliation causes indirect intervention. It is 
anticipated that the generated hypothesis will be confirmed by future large-N 
studies of all such cases during a span of time, with a specific emphasis on the 
dynamics of conflict intervention in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Keywords: Conflict, Third-Party Intervention, Indirect Intervention, Religious 
Identity, Religious Affiliation, Lebanon, Lebanese Civil War, Middle East
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ÖZET
D!N! MENSUB!YET VE DOLAYLI ÜÇÜNCÜ TARAF ÇATI$MA 
MÜDAHALES!: LÜBNAN !Ç SAVA$I'NA DA!R B!R H!POTEZ
Shishmanian, Haig Philip
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası !li%kiler
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özgür Özdamar  
Mart 2014
 Etnik ve dini tanımlanmı% gruplar çatı%malara sıkça katılırlar.  Böyle 
çatı%malar, ço"unlukla bir etno-dini grubun di"eri üstünde desteklendi"i 
üçüncü taraf müdahalesi türlerinin ilgisini çeker. Kullanılan müdahale araçları 
ço"unlukla do"rudan askeri müdahaleki araçlardan farklıdır.  Bu çalı%ma ilk 
olarak literatürün iki alanında iki farklı temayı vurgular. (1) Siyasette dinin rolü 
üzerine çalı%malar, genellikle dini mensubiyet olarak anla%ılan dini grupla%ma 
türlerini kapsar. (2) Çatı%ma müdahalesi literatürü, do"rudan askeri 
müdahalenin dı%ında, müdahalenin birçok türünü içerir; fakat, böyle türleri 
kapsayan bir de"i%kenin detaylı açıklaması yeterli de"ildir.
Tanımı literatürden kavramsalla%tırılan dolaylı müdahale de"i%keni bu tezin ilk 
katkısıdır. Bu tez aynı zamanda gözönünde bulundurmaktadır ki çatı%malarda 
dinen tanımlanmı% üçüncü tarafların ‘karde%lere’ dolaylı yardım edi%i günümüz 
uluslararası siyasetinde ortaya çıkmasına ra"men, bu ikisi arasındaki nedensel 
bir ili%ki daha önce ifade edilmi% ama daha ara%tırılmalıdır.  Lübnan !ç Sava%ı 
sırasında Maruni Arap toplulukların partilerine ve silahlı güçlerine Batılı 
deste"in verilmesi olayında dini mensubiyet ve dolaylı müdahalenin ele alındı"ı 
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hipotez-üreten vaka analizi yaparak, bu tez dini mensubiyetin dolaylı 
müdahaleye neden oldu"unu hipotezle%tirir.  Ortado"u ve Kuzey Afrika’daki 
çatı%ma müdahalesi süreçlerine özel bir vurguyla, üretilen bu hipotez gelecekte 
belli bir zamanda böyle olayların büyük datasetlerini ve çoklu de"i%kenlerini 
içeren çalı%malarda desteklenebilir.
Anahtar kelimeler: Çatı%ma, Üçüncü Taraf Müdahalesi, Dolaylı Müdahalesi, 
Dini Kimlik, Dini Mensubiyet, Lübnan, Lübnan !ç Sava%ı, Orta Do"u
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
 Discussions of politics in conflict-prone areas are ridden with references 
to ethnicity, religion, and sect.  Both historically and in the contemporary era, 
journalists and scholars generally gravitate toward characterizing political crises 
and civil conflicts as having an ethnic or sectarian nature when such groupings 
exist.  Johnson (2012) clarifies the distinction between national groups’ 
nationalist claims and ethnic identities’ ethnic solidarities as summed up in 
ambitions for statehood.  While nationalist particularly designate borders and 
legitimacy of governance as belonging to a particular group, it is ethnic 
solidarities that often conflicts with other ethnic groups’ “visions of identity, 
borders, and citizenship of the state”.  Thus, civil conflicts are often described as 
ethnic, with ethnic solidarities vying for political influence and control in their 
particular contexts.
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 Ethnic conflicts are rarely devoid of religious features.  Perhaps all 
ethnically-oriented crises of the 20th and 21st centuries, most of which involve 
religion to different extents, can be viewed through the lens of religious 
solidarity.  Populations united by affiliation with a particular religion or 
religious sect are often acting in complete opposition to religious belief, but 
nonetheless understood as religious because of the kind of grouping that unites 
them.  Philpott (2007) writes that  “political scientists are most at home when 
they describe states - how states make their decisions, how they interact, and 
who influences them. They are far less nimble with religions, which are far 
older...make claims far larger...entail a membership far wider...and indeed often 
accept the legitimacy of states only conditionally...they are 
transnational” (Philpott, 2007: 506).  
 In ethnic and civil conflicts, such religious grouping often exists to unite 
towards a common goal and ethnic or national conception.  Between the Middle 
East and Europe, the conception of the Crusades as a conflict between Western 
Christendom and Islam lays the backdrop for the uniting power of religious 
identification.  In the 20th century, within the Middle East, ethnic solidarity and 
nationalism associated with the Turkish national struggle or Arabism and the 
modern nation state have frequently both benefited from the uniting power and 
conflicted with Sunni (or, in some cases, Shia) Islamism, which crosses borders 
and boundaries and gives Muslims a sense of brotherhood outside of their 
formal citizenship-based identities.  Studies of conflicts in the Middle East often 
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include a designation of the sects of those involved, whether they are identified 
as Muslims, Christians, or Jews, regardless of whether religious belief is 
contributing to the conflict.
 Understanding identity is both crucial to studies of conflict involving 
identity as well as that of third-party intervention. Third-party intervention in 
civil and ethnic conflicts is often carried out by religiously-affiliated third-party 
governments on behalf of similarly-affiliated groups. Such instances can be 
traced since the Crimean War, when the religious sects of various European 
powers determined their vying for influence and protection of rights to sacred 
sites in Jerusalem, becoming an internationalized conflict fought for reasons 
outside the scope of the original grievances themselves.  Both France and Russia 
were self-declared and, to an extent, officially the guardians of Ottoman 
Christendom, beginning in the 19th century and leading into the First World 
War.  This became particularly perplexing when the Ottoman Empire, fighting 
what was presented to its Muslim population as a holy war, allied with Christian 
Germany and engaged in war against Christian Russia and France, who both 
had relations with groups in Anatolia, including but not limited to its Christian 
populations.  The war went on while religiously-affiliated but ethnically diverse 
Sunnis were united under the vision of a Turkish nation, leaving little room for 
Ottoman Christians in the new ideal of Turkish nationalism, which later 
conflicted with non-Sunnis as well.
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 In contemporary politics, the end of the Cold War has resulted in an era 
initially seeming somewhat devoid of such bias in intervention. The US 
intervened in the Balkans on behalf of Muslims in the 1990s; Russia supports 
Muslims in Georgia’s conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; France supported 
anti-Syrian groups in the Middle East in the 1990s and 2000s, leading to an 
anti-Assad policy in the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011.  Still, ethnic 
and religious identity plays a role in the contemporary Middle East.  Most often, 
Sunni-identified countries such as Saudi Arabia are frequently supporting 
groups throughout the Middle East in conflict with Iranian-backed Shia militias. 
 This study responds to the need to move past anecdotal evidence and 
explain the role of religious identity in civil conflict and third-party 
intervention.  This is done first through a rigorous critical review of literature 
discussing the relationship between religion and international politics, 
concluding that, in addition to the way it has been studied in the past, religion 
also needs to be studied through the lens of social grouping as a social 
phenomenon which groups populations across national boundaries and is most 
accurately termed as religious affiliation.  Since religious affiliation1 is often 
observed as influencing third-parties’ support of militias and parties involved in 
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1 This term, crucial to this study, is nonetheless problematic. Works such as Singer (1963); 
Varshney (1998); Fox (1999b); Fox (2002); Varshney (2002); Gabriel, Appleby and Sivan 
(2003); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Lemke and Regan (2004); Wilkinson (2004); Fox (2004c); 
Birnir (2007); Chandra and Wilkinson (2008); Birnir et al (2011); Birnir and Satana (2013); 
Satana et al (2013) point to how religion itself does not encourage conflict but provides 
convenient administrative and social avenues for action. It is important to view religious 
affiliation in the definition used later in this literature review, which involves both structure and 
sentiment but lacks religion itself (which is too broad a concept to be isolated into one variable) 
and religious belief (which is not consistently proven to be a primary cause of conflict).
civil conflict, the study looks first to define religious affiliation and third-party 
indirect intervention 2, that is, anything short of direct military intervention on 
the part of a third-party in support of a similarly religiously-affiliated militia or 
party in civil conflict.
 This study focuses on the Middle East and North Africa region for three 
reasons: (1) It is one of the commonly-cited regions prone to ethnic and 
religiously-related conflicts; (2) it is a crucial focus for potential intervention 
(both direct and indirect) on the part of western powers in contemporary 
politics (e.g. Calls for intervention in Libya between 2011-2013; Calls for 
support of militias and parties and direct intervention in Syria between 
2011-2014; Calls for diplomatic intervention in Egypt between 2011-2014); and 
(3) its religiously-affiliated ethnic demarcations carry tremendous importance 
as to their implications for the notion of a worldwide ‘clash of civilizations’ and 
the general role of global Islamism, especially since the al-Qaeda terrorist 
attacks in the US in 2001.  
 In order to focus on issues pertaining to the Middle East and North 
Africa while learning from a contemporary case, this study focuses on the 
Lebanese Civil War in order to generate a hypothesis regarding the relationship 
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2 ‘Indirect’ is a limited term which may imply a complete lack of confrontation, though it is 
meant in this study to isolate forms of intervention other than military invasion.  It will be used 
for the purpose of consistency in this study, but any future study based on this work will use 
more specific terminology which does not rule out diplomacy. Diplomacy is intuitively direct in 
that it is neither secret nor done far from the conflict. For future studies to discuss what this 
study refers to as ‘indirect intervention’, a more accurate term which describes the non-invasive 
nature of such intervention will be synthesized.
between religious affiliation and third-party indirect intervention in civil wars.  
The case particularly focuses on the US and France’s support of Maronite 
(Eastern Catholics in full communion with the Vatican) militias and political 
parties.  Conclusions from this case offer a unique perspective into religious 
affiliation broadly without focusing directly on political Islam, which is often the 
case in studies of conflicts in the Middle East, with “the new terrorism 
literature” singling out “Islam as a religion that breeds violence” while 
“grievances such as the lack of access to legislative coalitions...make minorities 
more likely to rebel” (Satana et al, 2013: 44). The results of the study are meant 
to be tested and applied to religious affiliation in the context of any religion and 
sect.
 The case study uses hypothesis-generation, in which a case which merely 
involves the existence of particular variables is studied in order to generate a 
causal relationship between those variables.  In this case, the two variables are 
those extracted from the literature review: Religious affiliation and indirect 
intervention.  With the definitions established in the literature review, process-
tracing is employed to isolate instances of religious affiliation and indirect 
intervention in the case in order to view a process of events leading from one 
variable to another, thereby allowing for a hypothesis to be generated.  The 
result of the hypothesis-generating case study, which focuses on the US’ and 
France’s relationship with Maronite parties and militias, will propose a causal 
relationship which can be tested in future large-N studies involving datasets of 
 6
civil wars including the two variables over a long period of time.  Thus, the 
contribution of this study is threefold: Religious affiliation is highlighted in the 
literature, noted as in need of further operationalization, and defined; Indirect 
intervention is established as a new categorization of forms of third-party 
conflict intervention; and a hypothesis suggesting a causal relationship between 
the two variables (referring to one as a dependent variable and the other as 
independent) emerges, to be tested in future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
 Religion is too-often treated as an ‘invisible factor’ in international 
relations and, specifically, the study of ethno-religious conflict and intervention.  
Scholars observe a rise in recognizing identity as a factor in international 
politics, especially in the post-Cold War era.  While a common theme in the 
study of identity, religion often continues to be ignored.  This paper reviews 
literature in the subject areas of civil war, third-party intervention, and religion 
in international relations.  These areas, often cross-referenced when foreign 
policy analysts and scholars of conflict studies look to incorporate ethno-
religious identity in their analysis, are difficult to place within a theoretical 
tradition of international relations.  Nonetheless, they do roughly derive from 
specific strands of theoretical assumptions. Most importantly, literature on 
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ethnic conflict allows religious identity to be viewed as a particular type of 
ethno-religious identity (Akbaba, 2006; Fox, 2001; Fox, James, Li, 2009) in the 
form of religious affiliation. 
 This section shows in detail how a research question was reached 
through critical literature review of increasingly specific areas of literature, each 
requiring further exposition in a more specific area, finally reaching a gap in the 
literature to be addressed with formal research in the following sections.  This 
section begins with a critical review of literature on religion and international 
politics , which is leads into the question of what is actually being studied.  It is 
next concluded that religion must be studied as a social phenomenon, and that 
the existence of religious affiliation transnationally affects how international 
relations is understood.  Next, other terms associated with religious affiliation 
concept of religious affiliation are sorted for their meaning, leading to 
‘affiliation’ being isolated as the most comprehensive term.  This leads into a 
discussion of how such religiously-affiliated groups are often found assisting 
each other in conflict in historical observations, which opens the need for an 
examination of literature on third-party intervention. While features of third-
party intervention in ethno-religious conflicts are examined, it is noticed that 
affiliated groups often assist one another in ways that are not necessarily 
involving direct military invasion.  It is then confirmed that religious affiliation 
is often a cause of third party intervention in ethno-religious conflicts, and lastly  
that a new variable being defined as indirect support is proposed to be related to 
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the existence of religious affinity.  A final discussion of the relationship between 
religious affiliation and indirect intervention leads to the research question: 
What is the causal relationship between religious affiliation and indirect 
intervention?
2.2 Religion and International Politics
 A concise and universally acceptable understanding of the concept of 
religion and its varied usage in scholarship is the first problem that scholars 
encounter in this area.  Kulbakova (2000) discusses a differentiation between 
“religion” and “religions”, the former being the broad societal phenomenon and 
the latter a more objective focus on institutions which greatly loses a holistic 
understanding of religion in general, since it is by no means confined to 
established institutions in any globally locatable context.  A question that arises 
in a reading of Kulbakova’s (2000) description is the context of differing 
political theologies.  Her description of embedded religiously-rooted 
approaches, language, and meaning within IR scholarship tinged with post-
modernism is specific to a historical contingency based on a particular 
experience with Christianity in the West.  It is thus questionable whether 
religion can be understood as a broad phenomenon with the existence of 
immense heterodoxy and conflicting understandings across the spectrum of 
religion” which constitute religion in general (Kulbakova, 2000). 
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 There is also a definitional problem in observing religion because of 
instrumental usage of concepts, grievances, principles, and language associated 
with it.  Instrumental usage varies greatly across political systems and the 
dynamics of historically contingent religious and ‘post-religious’ societies and 
sub-cultures.  It is very difficult to differentiate between religious motivation 
and the instrumental usage of religious language.  Additionally, within 
scholarship, Kulbakova’s (2000) illustration of religion’s being embedded 
beneath the surface of post-modern studies demonstrates the complexity of 
differentiation.  The demarcation between religious and the non-religious is 
problematic in this vein, and thus the causality of phenomena traced to religion 
is difficult to establish because variables themselves are linguistically malleable.  
This study looks first to define a particular manifestation of religion in order to 
empirically explain its relationship with decision making dynamics (Kulbakova, 
2000).  Any study of the nebulous concept of religion needs to specifically 
define the aspect of religion or associated phenomenon it is examining.
 Katzenstein (2007) discusses religion and secularism in international 
relations first by rejecting the notion that the world order following the Peace of 
Westphalia did not include interstate concerns over religion, thus leading to the 
removal of religion as a factor in international relations.   Katzenstein (2007) 
attributes this removal to three idealisms of core theoretical approaches to 
international relations theory.  Realism, he says, discounts religion as a valid 
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explanatory variable because of its focus on the power struggle, disregarding 
religion as a side-show to realpolitik.  Liberalism and its favoring of 
cosmopolitanism, he describes, sees religion as a distraction from material-
oriented cooperation existing within liberalism’s understanding of an anarchical 
international system.  Lastly, according to Katzenstein (2007), Marxism also 
dismisses religion as an unimportant factor in comparison to the explanatory 
power of the great class struggle .
 Philpott (2007: 505) cites several examples involving the rise of religion 
in the realm of international relations.  These include the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran and religious resurgence in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the 
Middle East; the dominance of an Islamist party in Turkish politics beginning in 
2002; The prominence of the Hindu-Nationalist party in India in the 1990s and 
provocations toward Hindu-Muslim violence; The Second Vatican Council’s 
calls for democratization in the Philippines, Brazil, and Poland; Sri Lankan lack 
of separation between ‘sangha’ and state in the context of the Hindu Tamil-
Buddhist Sri Lankan war; Buddhism in Taiwan and South Korea calling for 
human rights; and evangelical protestant voting blocs in the US, Brazil, 
Guatemala, and Kenya.  In these cases, we can also observe a rise in the 
importance of religious identity to the study of international relations.  
Katzenstein (2007) discusses how the polarity and duality of Huntington’s 
thesis are too broad, requiring a more complex understanding. “Significant 
modernization of rationalization can be achieved through non-liberal forms of 
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nationalism that mobilize religion to the task of government at home and 
governance abroad” (Katzenstein, 2007: 4).  There is an aspect of religion and 
its relationship with society that has social power within and beyond state 
borders, not limited to the scope of religion in itself but related to religion as a 
social phenomenon involving grouping and mutual association.  Thus, religion 
should be examined as a social phenomenon.
2.3 Religion as a social phenomenon
 The importance of religions’ role in international relations and conflict 
may very well be on the rise.  Studying the impact of the social phenomenon of 
religion on conflict can often be more effective than discussing belief (Fox, 
2004a).  Religious belief is highly subjective, disputed, and largely outside of the 
scope of international relations as a field of political science, yet social scientists 
can approach religious identity similarly to how they approach ethnicity, not to 
imply that they are equal or identical but to emphasize how they can be 
similarly observed.  To assume to understand the nuances of religious belief 
would imply scholars’ ability to engage with experts in religion and religions in 
particular.  Fox (2001b) explains the difficulty in operationalizing religious 
belief because of its diversity and complexity.  Religious belief, contested 
through issues of doctrine and dogma, is too unclear to observe and 
differentiate (Akbaba, 2006).  Also, “non-religious” actions (actions committed 
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by “religious” groups) that are contrary to the beliefs, doctrine, or ideology of 
that religion are problematic.  Although actors can be defined as religious, this 
designation can do the disservice of deeming all of their actions as religiously 
motivated.  It is often quite difficult to demonstrate causality for such religious 
motivation because of the alternative motivations of supposedly religious actors 
(Kulbakova, 2000).  Thus, this study will focus on how religion influences 
collective identity, focusing on the observable societal effects of religion. 
 One form of collective identity that religion is related to is national 
identity.  Different conceptions of national identity, one prevalent form of social 
grouping, have complex implications for how religion interacts with identity.  
Walker Connor describes how nations are understood in the social sciences and 
proceeds to detail and critique multiple alternatives to the usage of the term.  
What is found is a diverse array of understandings of nation, but a critical theme 
is identified:  Every conception of nation either explicitly includes religion as a 
uniting factor or implies it in its definition of grouping.  Connor writes that “the 
most fundamental error involved in scholarly approaches to nationalism has 
been a tendency to equate nationalism with a feeling of loyalty to the 
state” (Connor, 1978: 378).  National identity is thus given a transnational 
nature (Connor, 1978: 383), but continues with varying conceptualizations.  
“Sense of homogeneity”, “sameness”, “oneness”, “belonging”, 
“consciousness” (Connor, 1978: 380) and other descriptions are used to define 
the nation.  Connor particularly cites and critiques the following alternative 
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conceptualizations of nation, which, according to his discussion, can involve an 
incorporation of religion: Ethnicity, Primordialism, Pluralism, Tribalism, 
Regionalism, Communalism, and Parochialism.
 Connor’s discussion of Ethnicity particularly comments on American 
sociologists’ role in attributing a very broad and diverse set of grouping-sources, 
including religion, language, minority-status, and race (Connor, 1978: 386).  He 
also refers to anthropologists’, ethnologists’, and other scholars’ general usage 
of ethnicity as referring to any group with a sense of common ancestry.  
Ethnicity, with its conceptual flaws, still can incorporate religion as a source of 
common identity.
 Primordialism and its “sentiments” and “attachments”, in Connor’s 
discussion, does not strictly incorporate religion, but does accept the possibility 
of its propensity to be a source of common ancestry (Connor, 1978:  388-389).  
Connor particularly criticizes literature on primordialism for its apparent 
hinting towards the lack of primordialism in modern societies, citing how many 
“modern” states experience the existence of such groups.  Thus, religious 
grouping and the rise of religious identity in the contemporary era certainly fits 
into the primordial paradigm.  Religion is seen in relation to ethnicity and 
primordial social groupings, and religion itself can also be categorized and 
understood as such.
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 Connor’s discussion of Pluralism, Tribalism, Parochialism, and 
Subnationalism do not explicitly include religion, but neither do their respective 
conceptualizations imply that it cannot be incorporated (Connor, 1978: 391-392, 
394-396).  Regionalism, at the level of “transstate identity”, citing the examples 
of European Regionalism and the Arab League, can certainly be viewed as 
incorporating transnational religious groupings, such as Roman Catholicism 
and Christendom in general or Sunni Islam or pan-Islamism (Connor, 1978: 
393).  In a similar vein, Communalism (Connor, 1978: 394), having risen out of 
the propensity for religious identity to divide South Asian peoples, especially in 
the Islamic-Hindu paradigm, can be easily understood as incorporating 
religious identity.
 Walker Connor’s every discussion and critique of nationalism and its 
alternative conceptualizations thus implies that religion as a social phenomenon 
in itself, in a universal sense, outside of individual religions’ particularities and 
even the ideological and theological implications of religion as a universal 
phenomenon, is a powerful identity-providing source that unites individuals in 
intrastate and interstate contexts.  In this study, it is important to limit the 
understanding of religious identity to the scope of broad social phenomena as 
opposed to entering into discussions regarding doctrine and belief.  Apart from 
a discussion on doctrine or belief, it is apparent than any source facilitating 
communal cohesion and “brotherhood” can have a role in identity formation. 
Fox (2004b) demonstrates how belonging (to different religions or 
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denominations) in itself as a source of group identity.  Gurr (1993) comments 
that religion is not different from any attribute of ethnic identity.  Within the 
realm of national identity, eliminating discussions of religious belief helps 
isolate the grouping factor of religion.
 Philpott (2007) writes that  “political scientists are most at home when 
they describe states - how states make their decisions, how they interact, and 
who influences them. They are far less nimble with religions, which are far 
older...make claims far larger...entail a membership far wider...and indeed often 
accept the legitimacy of states only conditionally...they are 
transnational” (Philpott, 2007: 506).  In the context of social sciences, it is 
imperative to consider how political scientists may overlook religion’s 
propensity to form groups in society.  Considering religion as an influence on 
interstate dynamics does not take away from an understanding of the 
international system as primarily consisting of states.  Rather, doing so provides 
an additional vantage point from which the nuances of power dynamics can be 
understood.  Since religion causes social groups to form, these social groups 
affect foreign policy or cause security dilemma for it.  The ability of social 
groups to work to shape relations through and despite the state also does 
emerge as a theme in the literature.  Thus, studies on religion as a social 
phenomenon, within the context of its similarity to ethnic identity, must 
incorporate domestic, interstate, or global issues.
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2.4 Transnational Religious Affiliation
 Fox and Sandler (2005) specify 5 important manifestations of religion, 
including: Identity, belief Systems, doctrine, legitimacy, and institutions.  
Identity, legitimacy, and institutions are taken into close consideration in this 
study, having less of an association with belief.  It is important to note the 
literature’s description of identity’s ability to act as a vessel across state 
boundaries. That is, religious identity can spread conflicts across borders 
because of shared religious affiliation.  Religion as a social group also allows 
identity to work through institutionalization, civil society, and political society 
(Haynes, 2010:6), structures which allow association and affinity to influence 
decision-making.  According to Fox (1999a: 119, 123), institutions have 
specifically been observed inhibiting peaceful resistance and tending to facilitate 
political opposition among ethno-religious minorities.  Religious 
transnationalism has also been known to operate, according to Haynes, “in 
opposition to state-based nationalism”, evident in the examples of the Islamic 
Ummah and the Roman Catholic Church and Vatican (Haynes, 2010: 6).  Fox 
additionally observes that the particularly religious element of religious 
nationalism is having an increasingly consequential impact on ethnic violence 
since the 1980s (Fox, 1999a).
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 The term “affiliation” is often found in literature referring to individuals 
who by association become part of a collective religious body.  Ruhtan Yalçiner 
discusses the inseparable character of “political and public recognition” from 
“ethno-cultural forms of affiliations” (Yalçiner, 2010).  Greig and Regan (2008) 
write that “religious affiliation would be the most common form of historical 
links to international organizations”, implying the communal identity and 
participation in religious institutions often takes individuals and groups beyond 
national boundaries into participation into transnational religious affiliation 
(Creig and Regan,2008: 763).  Dahlman’s (2010) discussion of the “Geographies 
of Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and War Crimes” expresses how aggressors often 
have a clear “sense of ethnic affiliation and territory” (Dahlman, 2010: 2).  
Benedict Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” includes a description of the 
state “bumping into” transnational communities, described as “discomforting 
realities”.  He specifies that “the most important of these was religious 
affiliation, which served as the basis of very old, very stable imagined 
communities not in the least aligned with the secular state’s authoritarian grid 
map” (Anderson: 98), demonstrating religion’s ability to create transnational 
blocs of affiliation.  Seul (1999) also writes that “...religion can serve as the 
primary marker dividing groups in conflict whether the groups’ religious 
identities are lightly or firmly held” especially since processes of secularization 
“tend to result in the development of multiple identity affiliations among 
society’s members”, with “latent religious affiliations and sentiments” arising in 
the context of secular state systems. In fact, Seul includes, religion has often 
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proven to “serve the identity impulse” more effectively than any other source of 
identity or affiliation, often influencing involvement in conflict. “The peculiar 
ability of religion to support the development of individual and group identity is 
the hidden logic of the link between religion and intergroup conflict” (Seul, 
1999: 566-577).  The effective and comprehensive nature of the literature’s 
definition of religious affiliation makes it the most appropriate focus for this 
study.  The following discussion of other available terminology explains how 
they refer to phenomena which are aspects of religious affiliation.
2.4.1 Other terms associated with religious affiliation
 The term “affinity” is used by Walker Connor (1978) to refer to the 
Hindu-Muslim divide in the Indian subcontinent, and can be understood 
relatively synonymously with affiliation.  His discussion of communalism 
involves citing scholars’ references to nations “divided along religious lines in 
their affinity toward Pakistan” (Connor, 1978: 395).  Many subsequent studies 
would look into the societal cleavages and multi-level elite-decisionmaking that 
would be carried out, especially in the dispute between Pakistan and India 
(notably over Kashmir) (Carment and James, 1996; Carment and James, 2000; 
Carment and Rowlands, 2007; James and Özdamar, 2007).  Carment, James, 
and Tayda% (2009) demonstrate this concept with reference to elites’ decision 
making being “imbued with a powerful affective component that includes (1) a 
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common sense of historic injustice; (2) shared identity; (3) religious affinity; (4) 
common ideological principles; or (5) a degree of inchoate racial-cultural 
affinity” (Carment, James, and Tayda%, 2009: 69).  Carment and James (1996) 
discuss how leaders whose constituencies are comprised of more than one 
ethnic group will be constrained in committing forceful acts against a similarly-
aligned ethnic group in another state - “this is particularly true if force is used 
against an adversary with which some members of the constituency have an 
ethnic affinity” (Carment and James, 1996: 541).  
 Lastly, “ethnic brethren” is a term with a meaning and usage similar to 
those of affinity and affiliation.  In Carment et al (2006), it is understood that 
“groups that believe they are threatened may seek out support from their ethnic 
brethren” and how similar groups expend resources “on behalf of ethnic 
brethren”.  This term is used to describe how “transnational identities and 
associated movements of people, resources, and ideas” affect cooperation 
among groups transnationally.  Along with affinity and affiliation, the literature 
on ethnic identity, including that of religious identity, points to such a 
transnational type of grouping associated with a particular self-definition 
(Carment, James, Tayda%, 2006,: 9, 11). 
 Huntington’s work also highlights how culture (often centered around 
religion) facilitates the “rapid expansion” of economic relations, citing the case 
of the Economic Cooperation Organization (including Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
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Afghanistan) as an example of affiliation binding groups together (Huntington, 
1993: 28).  Huntington also comments on identity, writing that “as people 
define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an ‘us’ 
verses ‘them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different 
ethnicity or religion”.  Again, the concept or religion’s identity-assigning power 
can be highlighted.
 Philpott (2007) writes about the political ambivalence of religion - how 
some groups follow a supreme leader, others have no hierarchical structure, and 
still others have competing leadership - yet is able to come to certain 
generalizations about the role of religion in politics.  He writes that “at some 
level of collectivity, leaders will speak in the name of their followers; a body’s 
members will largely tend this way or that” (Philpott: 506).  This observation is 
regarding religion’s ability to manifest a transnational affiliation bloc.  Philpott 
defines a religious actor as “any individual or collectivity, local or transnational, 
who acts coherently and consistently to influence politics in the name of 
religion” (Philpott: 506).  Any such individual or group can thus be understood 
as an actor, as long as there exists a unified identity-grouping and any (often 
arbitrary) purpose of existence (Philpott: 506).  It is also crucial to note that 
most of Huntington’s examples involve religiously-identified groups in conflict 
with one another, often regardless of belief and doctrine (Huntington, 1993: 
33).  Thus, we see a strong relationship between religious affiliation and action 
taken by foreign policy makers in a region.  
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2.5 Religious Affiliation and Conflict Intervention
 As demonstrated in much of the literature which focuses partially on 
ethnic and religious identity, a  theoretically and empirically examined 
phenomenon found in literature is the affect of ethno-religious affinity on 
conflicts and intervention. In the literature, this factor is rarely isolated and 
separated from religious ideology and communities which may exist in 
intersections of such affiliation, thus being used to view groups as strongly 
polarized and homogeneous in their unification against other ‘civilizations’.  
Studies on the relationship between ethno-religious factors and third-party 
conflict intervention show that the ethno-religious affinity of third-party 
leadership has a vital relationship with the decision to intervene in a 
neighboring civil conflict.  This is understood in the literature as existing and 
working transnationally through institutions, identity, and legitimization when 
both opportunity and willingness exist on the part of decision-makers.  Groups 
with similar affinity (or affiliation), often referred to as ethnic brethren, have 
been observed as more effectively attracting prospects of intervention than their  
non-ethnic counterparts.  “Emotional ties created by shared identity can create 
feelings of affinity and responsibility for oppressed kindred living elsewhere, 
motivating a state to intervene on their behalf” (Fox, James, Li, 2009: 164).  The 
proposition of ‘symmetry’  is observed to be linked to cooperation.  That is, 
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members of similarly affiliated groups support other members of the same 
grouping.  ‘Ethnic brethren’ support those they view as fellow brethren.  As 
these variables have neither been operationalized nor understood within the 
context of causality, it is crucial to study the relationship between affiliation and 
support.  Thus, the initial research question addresses whether religiously-
affiliated third-party government and sub-group in a neighboring country are 
more likely to cooperate than in a case where such affinity does not exist. 
 Affinities should be investigated as potentially causing intervention. Such 
affinities have been present in several conflicts since before the end of the Cold 
War, including the many conflicts in the Middle East related to Israel, Palestine, 
and Lebanon from the 1940s to the contemporary era; conflicts in the Balkans 
involving cooperation between Slavic and often Orthodox Christian groups and 
Russia (early to mid 1990s) and Sunni Muslim-majority countries such as 
Turkey supporting ethnic and religious brethren in Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Egypt, 
and Syria; Conflicts in the South Caucasus (1990s-present), involving actors 
such as Russia paradoxically maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with 
Azerbaijan while aiding Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh or taking anti-
Georgian policies in conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; conflicts and 
cooperation between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq (1990s-present), attracting 
Iranian and Saudi rivalries; conflicts between Islamist groups and their more 
secular opponents in Central Asian states (such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 
the 1990s and 2000s); and Sunni-Shia conflicts (with respective support from 
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Saudi Arabia and Iran) in Gulf States such as Yemen in the 20th century, still 
continuing into the 21st century.
2.6 Features of Third-Party Intervention in Ethno-
Religious Conflicts
 There is a great need when examining conflict and intervention literature 
to differentiate between different types of intervention (Carment and James, 
1996: 542).  In observing ethno-religious identity interacting with a third-
party’s decision to intervene in a neighboring civil conflict, the strategic 
opportunity of a state potentially losing control over a domestic conflict, leading 
to regional diffusion, is considered when evaluating a state’s chosen method of 
intervention.  Decision-makers have particularly practiced ‘softer’ diplomacy by 
employing political or diplomatic pressures especially when unwilling or 
incapable of providing resources (Carment and James, 1996: 522, 525).  The 
possibility of alternate forms of intervention leads studies of intervention 
towards diversity as well as confusion.  Carment and Rowlands (2001) write 
about the “problems of using broad and nebulous concepts” regarding 
intervention, writing that “it is useful to develop a meaningful definition of third 
party intervention that is consistent with current practice. Third party 
intervention does not refer simply to the physical presence of a managing agent” 
but as “outside involvement in the internal affairs of a state by military means 
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coupled with political and economic measures” (Carment and Rowlands, 2001: 
5).  Intervention can include diverse combinations of forms of intervention, 
including economic aid, diplomatic help and legitimacy, condemnation of 
opponents, financial and military aid, military training, intelligence, and other 
forms (Carment and Rowlands, 2001; Carment and James, 1996)
 Third-party support for the state center has been notably found to be 
more likely to result in the conclusion of conflicts as opposed to support of 
opposition groups, though economic support of an opposition group ethnically-
divided from the state-center has also been observed as highly successful in 
comparison to other forms of intervention.  The most successful intervention 
strategies have been to either support the government through military 
interventions (a success rate of just under 50%) or to intervene economically on 
behalf of the opposition, though only when the parties to the conflict are 
organized along ethnic lines (43% successful). Intervention supporting the 
government were twice as likely to succeed as those supporting the opposition 
(41%vs. 19%) (Regan, 1996: 345).  Thus, military intervention on behalf of the 
government and economic intervention on behalf of the opposition are the most 
successful forms of third-party intervention. It is worth considering all types of 
intervention which fall generally under these two areas, though this study will 
isolate a few in particular.
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2.7 Religious Affiliation as a cause of Third Party 
Intervention in Ethno-Religious Conflicts
 This study continues its focus on religious affiliation through explaining 
its causal effect on the decision to intervene.  Any study about third-party 
intervention in civil conflict and its relationship with ethnic ties or biases does 
not assign a negative connotation or ethical treatment of bias in intervention.  
Carment and Rowlands (2001), in their modeling of biased intervention and 
empirical testing on Kosovo before and after the NATO-led intervention, 
conclude that there is a place for bias in such interventions.  Intervention on 
behalf of a rebel or anti-government group was found most often to support the 
ending of ethnic cleansing in this case.  They also observe that, “If biased 
intervention does lead to escalation, it does not necessarily mean that bias is an 
inappropriate component of modern peacekeeping. It may simply be necessary 
to recognize that such an intervention is unlikely to be cheap, or that it is 
unlikely to lead to immediate de-escalation” (Carment and Rowlands, 2001: 45). 
Thus a study on the role of a certain type of bias implies nothing directly about 
whether such action is ethical or preferable, rather the question of ethics and 
appropriateness of action needs to be answered case by case in a different 
theoretical framework.  A study of affinity, related closely with the potential for 
bias,  could help strengthen the case for the effectiveness of bias and its 
propensity to attract intervention.
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 Despite ethnic alliances, a leader’s motivations for intervention are 
attributable to some framework of rational choice, though this rationality works 
through many domestic and international avenues of constraints.  It is given 
that core values of leaders and populations are at stake, including the possibility  
of complete or partial economic and political disruption of a state’s internal 
affairs (Carment and James, 1996: 525).  Overall, both domestic and 
international constraints intervene.  This further emphasizes the need to 
examine domestic, international, and global dynamics of intervention.
 A constraint which is both domestic and international is the availability 
of particular forms of intervention.  In Carment and James’ work, these fall 
under the broad categories of Mediation, Tacit Support, and Forceful 
Intervention.  Methods are attributed to the domestic realm because of the 
preferences of citizens, leaders, and the availability of resources.  They are also 
attributed to the international realm because of geographic constraints 
(Carment and James, 1996: 525) like the location of the Third-Party or that of 
the state experience Civil Conflict, as well as the nature of the conflict.  Though 
mediation and especially forceful intervention are largely examined in the study 
Third-Party interventions, the full scope of Tacit Support is left largely 
understudied.  Tacit or indirect intervention is traceable through identifying the 
existence of mediation, economic support, aid involving military supplies and 
training, different forms of diplomacy, and the use of state boundaries for 
cooperation (Carment and James, 1996).
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 A dilemma faced in intervention studies is the confusion of how military 
intervention is operationalized.  On one hand, Carment and James’ “Tacit 
Support” (1996) is differentiated from military intervention, while Carment, 
James, and Li specify that military intervention, on behalf of minorities in the 
MAR intervention data, includes “providing funds for military supplies, direct 
military equipment donations or sales, providing military training” (Fox, James, 
Li, 2009:  167).  The difficulty arises for the researcher in tracing the provision 
of funds for military supplies and such donations or sales, especially when these 
activities are often very covert.  It is also problematic to group these forms of 
military support from a foreign government in the same category as a direct 
military presence of said government.  A crucial case to examine is the drastic 
change in the dynamics of the Lebanese Civil War before the presence of US 
troops in Lebanon (while the US merely aided diplomatically and with weapons 
and training), once they arrived, and after their neutrality was compromised 
and presence targeted very violently in the bombing of the Marine barracks.  
Scholarship is in need of a differentiation between indirect forms of military 
intervention, which often come along with political intervention, and direct 
military intervention.
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2.8 Religious Affiliation’s effect on Indirect Support
 Within the scope of domestic constraints and their contribution to 
decisions to intervene, a key feature to examine is the autonomy of decision-
makers and institutional constraints (Carment and James, 1996).  Any study 
which looks to attribute such things as religious affiliation to intervention must 
examine how institutions constrain leaders and limit or enable such types of 
rationality to decision-making.  A democratically-elected leader or party will 
undoubtedly require  constituents to support religiously-affiliated decision-
making (or the appearance of it) in order to continue to remain in power 
(Carment and James, 2000: 530-531).
 In the international arena, regarding the situation on the ground in the 
state experiencing civil conflict, ethnic composition (Carment and James, 2000: 
532) and the presence of secessionism or irredentism, which often leads to 
“inviting external involvement based on transnational affinities” (Carment and 
James, 2000: 523) is a determining factor in whether and how interventional 
will be pursued.  Ethnic affinity, though usually not enough to lead a state into 
direct intervention, will often lead to the usage of indirect military support and 
diplomacy (Carment and James, 2000: 526).  This occurs in many cases, 
including those cited earlier, but the differentiation between cases in which 
direct intervention occurs and those in which intervention is strictly indirect 
needs to be made.  Carment, James, and Tayda% (2009) write about third-party 
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involvement in an affiliation-oriented conflict (on the part of a similarly 
affiliated group) being constrained if the rational choice (based on material and 
strategic interests) calculation does not favor intervention.  They classify low-
cost, indirect forms of intervention as any of the following “(1) an expression of 
humanitarian concerns; (2) a call for a negotiated settlement between the 
central government and rebels without jeopardizing the territorial integrity of 
the state; (3) a call for open-ended peace talks between the two parties; (4) a 
clear statement that the separatists have the right to self-determination; and (5) 
recognition of the separatist movement as a state” (Carment, James, and 
Tayda%, 2009: 70).  We can therefore study religious affiliation, if the only 
reason for intervention, as possibly correlated with indirect intervention.
 Fox, James, and Li (2009) come to a number of helpful conclusions in 
their study on religious affinity in particular and intervention in the MENA.  
They conclude that the MENA, an area particularly prone to intervention, 
especially on behalf of religiously-affiliated groups, is twice as likely as any other 
region to experience military interventions. Military intervention in a MENA 
ethnic conflict is over twice as likely as it is in other regions.  Especially 
prevalent is states’ intervening on behalf of fellow Muslims in other states.  
Though they note the existence of ‘Christian states’ intervening on behalf of 
other ‘Christian states’, they also note situations in which a state like the US 
intervenes on behalf of non-Muslims - the US’ intervention on behalf of Iraqi 
Kurds being primarily used.  Overall, the study demonstrates how religious 
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affiliation, particularly that attributed to Islamic identity in the MENA, is 
strongly correlated with the decision to intervene.  The study concludes with a 
suggestion for in-depth study and collection of data necessary to confirm the 
inferences made in the study, based on cases between 1990-1995 (Fox, James, 
and Li, 2009).
 A great concern with Fox, James, and Li’s (2009) work is that it doesn’t 
take into account the religious affiliation of the state-center that interventions 
are enacted against. For example, interventions on behalf of Kurds in Turkey 
executed by Syria or Iran are viewed as on behalf of Muslims.  This is true, but 
the causality that Fox, James, and Li are looking to confirm through future 
studies is questionable when such affiliation is not demonstrated to lead to 
intervention in the face of a non-affiliated option.  If Turkey’s population were 
not majority Muslim, it would strengthen the potential causality of religious 
affiliation leading to intervention on behalf of the Kurds.  Any conclusions based 
on this case are put into question. There is a need for cases which show 
affiliation’s propensity to lead to intervention on behalf of fellow Muslims (or 
members of a particular sect, ie Shias or Sunnis) in the face of a non-affiliated 
option.  Fox, James, and Li  (2009) underline the weakness of the Minorities at 
Risk (MAR) data on interventions they use, clarifying that there is no data on 
cases of non-intervention.
 Throughout Fox, James, and Li’s (2009) work, there appears to be a need 
to identify a mechanism working between affinity and the decision to intervene.  
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It is not enough to simply infer that state and ethnic minority affinities 
sometimes lead to intervention (Fox, James, and Li, 2009: 161).  Similarly, there 
is a problem with the notion, articulated by Fox, James, and Li, of  “generally 
unsympathetic public opinion...rarely backed up by subsequent material action 
by governments” (Fox, James, and Li, 2009: 162) being a newer cause of anti-
Americanism in contrast to Cold War hegemony and alignment with either 
power.  This notion argues that the nature of conflict has changed.  This is 
intuitively problematic because of the pattern of conflicts in the Middle East 
before and after the end of the Cold War.  To name a few, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict; Frequent Civil Wars/Conflicts in Lebanon; Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq; 
and the current civil war in Syria.  If, in fact, there are more seemingly religious-
oriented conflicts than there were before, is it religious conflict in itself that is 
on the rise or is religious affinity and a mechanism associated with it more 
convenient for age-old power struggles to employ?  
 Before asking whether ethno-religious minorities attract more intervention 
than merely ethnic minorities, as Fox, James, and Li (2009) do, a crucial 
question is whether a certain mechanism in the process of such affinities 
existing and being associated with intervention provides something conducive 
for intervention (that may also exist in non-religious cases) and what kind of 
intervention this usually is.  For example, does the existence of religious 
organizations, naturally associated with religious groups, which transcend 
national boundaries and economies and fund various efforts locally and globally  
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facilitate intervention?  Do Islamic minorities (understood to be most attractive 
for intervention by Islamic states) simply exist in a point in time when 
transnational conditions allow for easier assistance of groups?
 Fox, James, and Li (2009) list 3 reasons illustrating the propensity for 
religion to cause intervention.  This study looks to add to those reasons by refine 
variables, re-group definitions of intervention, and hypothesize a causal 
mechanism explaining the relationship between religious affinity and 
intervention on behalf of similar groups.  Their discussion of the characteristics 
of interveners, conflicts, and the international system do not at all include a 
variable which can be existing in the intervener, the conflict, and the 
international system at the same time, encouraging indirect support of one 
group.  Religion itself may have very little to do with the conflict while domestic, 
international, and global phenomena which exist alongside religion may be the 
cause (Fox, James, and Li, 2009: 164-165).
2.9 The relationship between religious affiliation and 
indirect support
 Differences in religious identity make a difference in foreign policy 
decision-making and intervention when they differ amongst leaders but not 
necessarily amongst populations (Lai, 2006).  “Militant ethnic and religious 
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reorientation” in the context of the “decline of the modern nation state”, “new 
visions of collective identity”, and “collective identity as a resource” (Schaefer, 
2005) lead to local religious conflicts’ becoming international issues.  Military 
intervention has had a large focus in the area of such internationalization, but 
observations of indirect support (aiding a group within a conflict but not 
directly entering with a state’s own military) display a further need for isolated 
study of such cases.
 Fox includes a wide variety of activities in a description of military 
interventions, including funds for military supplies, direct military equipment 
donations or sales, military training, the provision of military advisors, rescue 
missions, cross-border raids, cross-border sanctuaries and in-country combat 
units.  Many of these are often not discussed in intervention studies because of 
their being more “under the radar” and indirect, though religious affiliations 
have shown to exist through relationships involving such support between Third 
Parties and a group on whose behalf such indirect aid is committed (Fox, 2003).  
 
 Further operationalization of indirect support is needed.  This sort of 
support is too often tied to direct support or simply ignored, especially in the 
case of shared religious affiliation.  The way that the modern nation state is 
often found collapsing opens borders and boundaries to regional diffusion of 
opportunities for promoting interests, especially through the “manipulation of 
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mass sentiments with political symbols and ideologies, allowing intervening 
states to “account for” ethnic crises in other states (Carment and James, 2000).  
States which intervene in ethnic conflicts are most likely to intervene on behalf 
of minorities (or groups in general) religiously similar to them.  This study 
essentially seeks to explain how conflicts are “extended”, “interacted” with, and 
“transformed” through international involvement (Carment, James, and 
Tayda%, 2009) in the context of “transnational ethnic alliances” (Davis and 
Moore, 1997).  The willingness to support brethren is determined by the 
potentially intervening state’s elite’s view of the affinity as important and 
specific groups in the state that elites are dependent on and looking to please 
(Carment, James, and Tayda%, 2009).  Iranian support of Hizbollah in Lebanese 
conflicts, Alawite-dominated Syrian regimes over the years, and Shias in 
Bahrain (especially during the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011-2012) are all examples of 
indirect support on the part of a group in civil conflict with similar religious 
affinity, in addition to those listed earlier.
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 This review of an array of literature contributes to two key descriptions for 
this study.
Table 1 
Religious Affiliation features all of the following:
1. Shared identification with a religious group or sub-group within a religious body
2. Members and corresponding institutions are associated (members of similar religious 
bodies and organizations) and affiliated (identified as members of the same sect).
3. Formal organizations and informal groupings based on ‘brotherhood’, both within state 
boundaries and transnationally
Table 2 
Indirect Intervention is anything short of military invasion involving one or more of the 
following: 
1. Political pressure or diplomatic support on behalf of one group
2. Political legitimacy in international organizations on behalf of a group
3. Economic aid for a group
4. Funds for military supplies
5. Military equipment donations or sales
*Indirect intervention is often directed with bias to a side with a common sectarian affiliation, 
yet it often involves constrained leadership which cannot become directly involved because of 
geographic, financial reasons or lack of public approval for providing tangible resources.
 
 This paper will thus look to identify these variables in a case in order to 
propose a testable hypothesis regarding their causal relationship.  
Operationalization of the variables will be possible because of how they are 
based on the literature, isolated, and defined in this section. The next sections 
will describe the type of research that will be carried out in order to propose a 
testable hypothesis regarding the causal relationship between religious 
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affiliation and indirect intervention.  The causal direction between the above 
variables (that is, which one is dependent and which is dependent) will be the 
end result of the research.
2.10 Alternative arguments and clarification
It is crucial at this point to comment on possible conclusions regarding the 
general relationship between religion and conflict, while clarifying what this 
study is not focusing on.  It is first to be clarified that the literature review has 
led to a need for a conclusive study of religious affiliation and not merely 
religious identity or religion in general.  Religion and ethnicity in their broad 
societal manifestations do not necessarily cause conflict (Fox, 2002), but rather 
provide stable and flexible choices in elections (Birnir, 2007; Birnir and Satana, 
2013). When it is, it is with particular conditions, such as only being found to 
cause conflict when existing alongside separatism (Fox, 2004c: 125).  This study  
is not focusing on political theology, religious belief, or practice.
 Fox (1999b) highlights the existence of religious legitimacy, defined as 
“the extent to which it is legitimate to invoke religion in political 
discourse” (1999b: 297) and its mixed effect on the emergence of religious 
grievance formation.  Religious grievances, defined as “grievances publicly 
expressed by group leaders over what they perceive as religious discrimination 
against them” Fox (1999b: 297).  Fox’s study concludes that the existence of 
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religious legitimacy in a country tends to facilitate grievance formation over 
non-religious issues only when religion is not an issue in a conflict.  The study 
also concludes that the existence of religious legitimacy is a hindrance to 
grievance formation over non-religious issues when religion is an issue in the 
conflict. That is, the prominence of religious legitimacy during a conflict can 
lead to religious grievances being prioritized over the non-religious. Though this 
study focuses on third-party intervention, studies such as Fox’s significantly 
inform the propensity of religion in society to facilitate action associated with 
religion.  When it comes to religious affiliation, it should be clarified that 
religion’s facilitating power, its ability to make action convenient, is being 
considered rather than religion itself.
 Fearon and Laitin (2003) refuted the conventional wisdom that the end 
of the Cold War gave rise to several civil wars, caused mainly by ethnic 
nationalism, concluding that these were more the result of conflicts which 
increased in number beginning in the mid-2oth century.  Their observation of 
the continuity of conflict processes is another key to this topic.  This continuity 
points to the reality that conflicts occur between previously-forged lines of 
cooperation and confrontation.  This strengthens the understanding that 
religion is not in itself a cause but a source that contributes to demarcations 
between which cooperation and conflicts can occur.  Birnir et al (2011) comment 
that the study of ethnic conflict has developed over the years to include “all 
ethnic and religious identity groups that provide a basis for political 
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mobilization and action”, implying a basis or structure which the mere existence 
of religious groups provide a conflict.  This, too, confirms the need to clarify the 
difference between studying religion and religious grouping.
 Fox (2005) details several studies investigating the relationship between 
religion and conflict, coming to several important conclusions about the often 
assumed relationships being considered.  One crucial observation he makes is in 
the prevalence of intra-religious conflict over inter-religious conflict. That is, 
Christians are found more often fighting against fellow Christians, and Muslims 
are found more often fighting against fellow Muslims (Fox, 2005: 60, 68).  
What this can imply about religion’s effect on conflict is that difference in belief 
itself is not likely to be a cause for conflict.  Anything ‘religious’ which might 
lead to conflict should be assumed to have less to do with the nuances of belief 
and more to do with organization, since religious groups from the same family 
often have organizational or structural reasons to conflict.  
 Another key observation that Fox (2004c) contributes to the understand 
of religion’s influence on conflict is that, though religion has the potential to 
influence all aspects of ethnic conflict, it only has only been observed to 
encourage ethnic rebellion while existing alongside separatism (and this has 
only been an observed trend after the 1980s) (Fox, 2004c: 125).  This adds to 
the important of understand religious affiliation specifically as a societal 
grouping which can lead to cohesion within a group which unites them towards 
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separatism.  The practical division from the state and central relationship which 
religious affiliation provides a group can indeed be associated with separatism 
but should not be confused with religion or religious belief.
 In Lemke and Regan (2004), J. David Singer’s ‘international influence’ 
model (1963) is examined, leading to two now long-time implications for 
intervention studies.  The first is that states with continuing interests in states 
experiencing civil war are likely to continue following their previous interest-
based patterns (Lemke and Regan, 2004: 164).  Any previous influence over 
domestic sub-groups in those states is likely to be continued.  Secondly, and 
most applicable to this study, Lemke and Regan point out that the model 
applies to states continuing cooperative policies and interactions.  Long-term 
religious affiliation established historically, rather than religious persuasion 
itself, can lead towards continued influence and cooperation.  Cooperative 
relationships existing structurally and sentimentally along with religious 
affiliation make smoother a third-party’s desire to cooperate, and make 
cooperation more convenient (Lemke and Regan, 2004: 165).
 The circumstances wrought by the existence of religion, affiliation 
associated with it, and cooperation along religious lines rather than for religious 
reasons is confirmed in contemporary studies.  Satana et al (2013) confirm that 
“religion per se is not a source of violence” though “extremist elements of ethnic 
minorities...may use religious divergence to mobilize group members to 
 41
perpetrate terrorism (Satana et al, 2013: 29).  Though this study is not 
attempting to isolate extremism or study terrorism, these observations help to 
clarify how a societal phenomenon like religious affiliation can practically 
motivate toward action, providing an “organizational platform” for action 
(Satana et al, 2013: 44).  
 Several more works can be cited which demonstrate that religion does 
not in itself cause conflict.  Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (2003) include an in-
depth overview and analyses of various manifestations of religious 
fundamentalism in the context of several different religious families, 
emphasizing the role of fundamentalism itself in leading to action.  Varshney 
(1998; 2002) and Wilkinson (2004) discuss how civic ties between religious 
groups have helped to contain and even prevent inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
conflict and preserve democracy in India for many decades.  This illustrates an 
ambiguity in religion’s role in contributing to conflict, suggesting that it is 
completely dependent on the societal structures in which religion is found.  
 
 The final clarification needed for an accurate understanding of the role of 
religion in this study comes from Chandra and Wilkinson’s (2008: 515) 
differentiation between what they term as “ethnic structure” and “ethnic 
practice”.  Their critical review of how hypotheses about the effects of ‘ethnicity’ 
have been constructed in the past lead to the discovery of how identifying 
ethnicity as encompassing both structure and practice leads to confused and 
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distorted results as to ethnicity’s effect on conflict and civil war.  They detail that 
“we use data on ethnic identities across the world collected without a definition 
of what those identities are” leading to empirical models and data interpreted 
“without knowing how the data were generated and what they mean” (Chandra 
and Wilkinson, 2008: 516).  Specifying that ethnicity, like politics, is a large, 
complicated concept, they conclude that “when studying how ‘ethnicity’ matters, 
we must also replace that large concept with narrower, more meaningful 
ones” (Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008: 517).  
 In the context of the divide between structure and practice, the definition 
of religious affiliation is found similar to ethnic structure while differentiated 
from religious practice.  What religious affiliation has in addition in its 
definition is more room for shared emotional sentiments.  While structure does 
not necessarily involve members having a sense of brotherhood, and practice 
may not assert this, the nature of what is being identified as religious affiliation 
gives room in the definition for such a phenomenon.  Hence, the definition of 
religious affiliation, when clarified, is separate from all of religion in general, the 
influence of which on conflict has often been refuted.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH & METHODOLOGY
 An attempt to define and understand a phenomenon at the intersection 
of international relations theory, conflict and intervention studies, and the study  
of religion and ethno-religious identity in politics first requires qualification as 
to the variables and dynamics between them.  The variables that this study has 
identified through a review of literature are religious affiliation and indirect 
intervention.  Though these have been described, a clearer operationalization is 
needed and can be established through a case study.
 The particular case study methodology chosen is with respect to the need 
to more descriptively understand these variables.  Rather than beginning with a 
theoretical framework, this study begins with observations from literature 
which demand empirical qualification and operationalization.  A concrete 
hypothesis of theoretical nature - one that suggests the causal relationship 
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between variables - can be arrived at through a case in which variables are 
identified and allowed to demonstrate their own causal relationships.  
 The particular case study method is thus that of hypothesis-generation.  
A hypothesis-generating or heuristic case study is a single study study design 
which can have great implications for how the dynamics of theoretically-
discussed phenomena occur in their actual corresponding events (Lijphart, 
1971).  This study has taken a look at literature discussing interventions, ethno-
religious issues, sectarian and religious issues.  These studies are based on 
empirical research but largely leave cases to the sidelines in order to engage in 
highly abstract discussions based on generalizations.  Generalizations in the 
literature have left a gap, which this study looks to understand more specifically. 
That gap is the specific operationalization of religious affinity and indirect 
intervention.  There is thus a need to engage in a case study which would 
demonstrate these variables to exist and to interact theoretically.  A hypothesis-
generating case study identifies certain variables in a case and looks to the case 
to solidify how these variables interact in a theoretical sense.
 In political economy, notable hypothesis-generating case studies (often 
initiated without the intention of generating hypotheses) have highlighted 
profound theoretical implications for their respective subject matter.  A 1935 
study on the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, “Politics, Pressure, and the 
Tariff” (Schattschneider, 1935), had great implications for how studies in the 
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future would understand US political economy in particular and the political 
economy of international trade barriers in general.  This study is notably 
frequently cited as an authority on the view that U.S. trade policy results from 
uncontrollable and overpowered special interests in Washington.  
Kindleberger’s (1973) study on the Great Depression, which indicated that the 
drastic nature of the economic crisis was a result of the U.S. not taking the 
world-leading role that Great Britain could no longer take, contributed strongly 
to the idea that the interwar period required a world-stabilizer which would 
only emerge after WWII - both economically and militarily - and the overall 
theory of Influential Hegemony (Odell, 2002).
 In the field of International Relations, arguably the most significant 
hypothesis-generating case study is that of the fall of the USSR and the end of 
the Cold War.  This event would first serve to challenge both realist and liberal 
IR theorists because of their failure to predict it.  In this sense it can be partially 
understood as a single ‘least likely’ case study, in which a least-likely outcome’s 
occurrence serves to challenge theory and illuminate its inadequacy.  It was also 
in the critical moment that social constructivism in international relations was 
emerging, viewing the latter years of the USSR (even before the fall) and the 
nature of the accepted ‘mutually-assured destruction’ as socially constructed.  
This hypothesis would fully emerge in a view of the fall of the USSR and end of 
the Cold War as previously unpredictable with the conventional tools of IR 
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scholarship, creating new analytical tools such as constructivism and neo-
classical Realism.
 In the same way, this study looks to pinpoint a case which would engage 
with variables found in the literature which have yet to be understood well 
theoretically.  Just as the notion of mutually-assured destruction and the view of 
the ‘other’ as ‘enemy’ were brought to the fore as potentially socially constructed 
during and after the end of the Cold War, this study will use a case to first 
identify a religious affiliation and indirect intervention, and to understand their 
causal relationship.  This identification and causal relationship can be used in 
future large-n studies for large-scale, generalized understandings of a generated 
hypothesis across many cases and a large period of time. 
3.1 Identifying the variables
 In order for a case to generate a hypothesis, variables must be 
identifiable.  This study observes religious affiliation, domestically and 
internationally,  and indirect third-party intervention in a civil war along the 
lines of shared religious affiliation.  The literature discussed provides a 
framework for identifying religious affiliation and indirect intervention.  The 
variables described in the conclusion of the literature review will be identified in 
the sources through simple content analysis involving categorizing and coding.  
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Categorization is already outlined in the description of the variables, while 
coding will involve scanning historical descriptions and identifying when 
descriptions fit what has been categorized.  Once content is further analyzed 
through process tracing, illustrating and series of cause and effect relationships, 
causality can be hypothesized.
3.2 Determining causality through process tracing
 
 After the variables are identified in the case through the definitions above 
by examining the components listed, causality between the variables can be 
established through process tracing.  This method has been described as 
identifying a set of dominoes that fell, one after another, to finally cause a 
concluding outcome.  This study will need to chronologically examine a case, 
identify all instances of the existence and action of religiously affiliated groups 
and indirect intervention, and outline the order in which these occurred, 
explaining the causal relationship between each event (Bennett, 2002), 
revealing a process beginning and ending with the variables (Van Evera, 1997: 
64).  The causal ‘direction’ of each instance in the case will be determined by 
which variable ‘initiates’ the action after process tracing is completed.
 
 Process tracing entails searching for "intervening phenomena that form 
the causal chains" (Van Evera, 1997: 64) between two events.  Van Evera (1997) 
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discusses how Kenneth Waltz’s argument that global bipolarity leads to peace 
suggests the process of "less false optimism...about the relative power of 
opponents” and “easier cooperation and faster learning by each side about the 
other, leading to thicker rules of the game; faster and more efficient...moves by 
each side to balance growth in the other's power or to check the other's 
aggressive motives, causing deterrence” (Van Evera, 1997:64-65).  An effort to 
determine whether bi-polarity truly leads to peace would thus involve looking 
for “evidence of these phenomena in cases of bipolarity...and, if they are found, 
for evidence that they stemmed from bipolarity" (Van Evera, 1997: 65).  In the 
same way, this study will locate the observable of the two variables above and 
chronologically trace their relationship with the intention of tracing a causal 
process.  Historical background establishing religious affiliation will be 
included.  Also, each year of the case study will be presented, along with 
observed actions taken that fit into the 5 forms of indirect intervention (defined 
on p. 29) in that year.  The following is a basic illustration of how the data will 
be displayed:
Table 3 Sample year-by-year observations
1900 1901 ...
3: Economic aid for a group 
Z
...
5: 9 September - Weapons 
sales to group Z
...
 At the end of the case study, if a ‘chain’ of events can be found leading from 
one variable to another (if variable x is more prevalent in the beginning of the 
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case, and variable y more in the end), the resulting (effect) variable will be 
hypothesized as the independent variable, while the initial (cause) variable will 
be hypothesized as the direct variable.
3.3 Case Selection
 A look at the political atmosphere of the Middle East in the late 2000s and 
early 2010s demonstrates several possible instances of the existence of the 
variables.  Sunni-identified government elites, such as those of Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey, are helping Sunni-affiliated political parties and militarized groups in 
Gulf Crises, war in Libya, political crisis Egypt, and civil war in Syria.  The Shii-
affiliated government of Iran helps the Shii-affiliated Alawite-led government of 
Syria as well as the Shii-leaning parties, populations, and militarized groups of 
Gulf states in crisis.  
 These crises are still being studied in a period of highly politicized 
journalism and scholarship in which the ‘dust’ has not at all settled.  Yet these 
lines of assistance are not historical anomalies from a theoretical point of view.  
Many past crises have involved religious affiliation and indirect assistance along 
sectarian and religious lines, within the scope of political Islam as well as 
politicized Christendom.  The Crimean War was arguably sparked by completely  
affiliation-motivated grievances on the part of the ‘Christian powers’ and claims 
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to holy sites in Jerusalem in the context of Ottoman rule.  WWI was fought with 
a pan-Islamic notion that European Christian powers were looking to destroy 
the last of Ottoman civilization, while Western notions of the Christian West 
bringing order and justice to lands ridden by the ‘Eastern Question’ prevailed.  
These were issues of identification and affiliation, with grouping having power 
in itself to affect decision-making.  Middle Eastern politics in the 20th century 
was marked by struggles between the rise of a new Islamism against secular 
nationalist governance, which was viewed to be an affront from the ‘other’ in the 
West.  Perhaps the most crucial case with the potential for hypothesis 
generation is that of the Lebanese civil war, during which sectarian affiliations, 
domestic, regional, and international goals were achieved through many 
interconnected relationships and animosities along the lines of ethnic 
affiliation, as well as contrary to them.
 This hypothesis-generating case study, which will employ process-tracing, 
examines the case of the Lebanese Civil War, the study of which would allow a 
hypothesis about the relationship between religious affiliation and indirect 
intervention to be formed.  This case is well-documented and historicized by 
scholars of many backgrounds, so the problem of ongoing dynamics and not 
having the ‘dust settled’ is not faced by this case.  It is also a case which took 
placed during the Cold War.  This is an advantage because of the common 
understanding that the nature of civil wars changed after the Cold War.  If 
commonalities can be discovered between Cold War-era civil conflict in the 
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Middle East and contemporary dynamics, this studies contribution to 
intervention studies can be understood more uniformly and comprehensively, 
making the conclusions less particular to a certain period.  An examination of 
the Lebanese Civil War, with its possibly parallel theoretical implications for 
contemporary conflicts in the middle east (with very similarly-affiliated groups 
existing across the spectrum of middle east conflicts today), has the propensity 
to generate a hypothesis that would help better explain the world of the ‘Arab 
Spring’, Syrian Civil War, and beyond. 
 The case study examines only one strand of indirect intervention in the 
relationship between Western governments and majority-Maronite political and 
militant groups during the Lebanese Civil War.  It primarily examines 
Christian-affiliation in the Middle East, but touches upon that of  all sects due to 
their interrelatedness.  The case study looks to generate a hypothesis as opposed 
to other forms of case studies which utilize the comparative or crucial case 
methods.  The hypothesis-generating case study begins with newly-emerging 
variables.  The contribution of this hypothesis-generating study is a hypothesis 
which is to be confirmed by crucial cases, comparative studies, and large-N 
statistical studies in the future.  Choosing a case which features sectarian 
dynamics characteristic of most contemporary conflicts in the Middle East 
allows for such a generated hypothesis to make a significant contribution.
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 A historical background of the relationship between the Maronite 
community in Lebanon and its ‘Christian brothers’ in the West lays the 
backdrop for the case and establishes the existence of relations and channels of 
assistance.  The case study itself examines the years between and including 
1975-1990, giving a general overview of nearly all political parties, their 
respective militias, areas of influence, and international relationships.  It then 
outlines in-depth any international actions that took place on behalf of the 
Maronite political parties, militias, and population in general during these 
years.  The case study will examine the process of indirect intervention and how 
this was hindered or facilitated.  The ultimate purpose of the case study is to 
identify a new multi-level variable which accounts for affiliation-oriented 
indirect intervention.
3.4 Process Tracing: Sources
 This case study requires examining descriptive accounts of the Lebanese 
Civil War.  The sources used will be far from an exhaustive compilation of 
descriptive accounts of the events that took place within the context of the 
Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990).  Still, the use of multiple books written both as 
historic (primarily written for the purpose of understanding the chain of events 
in a certain period) and scientific (primarily written to illustrate the interaction 
between social, political, and economic structures) accounts will serve to 
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minimize the overlooking of crucial details.  The purpose of the study is not 
primarily to be exhaustive but to illustrate the potential existence of a 
theoretical relationship between observed variables, therefore only well-
referenced and thorough sources will be used.
 Reading of these descriptive accounts will involve taking note of activity 
that fits the description of the two variables qualitatively.  First, a year-by-year 
list of such observations will be compiled from multiple sources.  Second, the 
components observed in the initial observations will be taken note of.  When 
Indirect Intervention is observed (in the A component), the type of intervention 
will be differentiated by a number 1, 2, ... 5 depending on the type it corresponds 
to in the definition above.  Third, the system of components will be illustrated in 
a similar fashion as the one above, displaying the inner-workings of the 
interaction between two variables. Last, a generated hypothesis will be proposed 
for future studies.  Before including the results of the case study, this paper 
includes an in-depth account of the historical background to Religious 
Affiliation between Lebanese Maronites and Western political, economic, and 
religious leadership.
 54
CHAPTER 4 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
4.1 Who are the Maronites?
 In the 7th century AD, communities of Aramaic-speaking Christians 
began to exercise significant political authority in the western portion of Syria. 
The Maronite church formed from rural-dwelling Syrian Christians resisting 
ecclesiastical control, finding refuge in Lebanon’s rugged mountain ranges, 
easily gaining the enmity of invading Muslim Arabs in their support for the 
Byzantine empire and its control of much of the Syrian coast. The Maronites 
included a powerful class of muqadams under the authority of priests and 
bishops accountable to the central authority of the patriarch, a chief-like leader 
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with a religious and administrative form of governance that would be carried 
into the modern era (Salibi, 1988: 87-91).  The Maronites may have gained 
adherents in this period through association with the Mardaites or Jarajimah, 
rebellious Christian tribes which challenged Abbasid rule in and around the 
Lebanon mountain range (Mount Lebanon) (Winslow, 1996: 11).  
 The Maronites derive ethnically from one or more of the following: 
Christian Arabs that migrated to Syria from the Arabian Peninsula before and 
during the Islamic invasion, ancient Phoenicians, and non-Arab Christians of 
Syria and Mesopotamia (most likely Syriac-speaking). The Ghassan Arabs of 
Syria were particularly notable as an Arab Christian group whose chiefs were 
given governing authority by Emperor Justinian.  Though Maronites in their 
early history used Aramaic as a liturgical language, this is not  particularly 
indicative of ethnic origin because this was true of most Arabic-speaking 
Christian and Jewish-Christian sects of Syria, Iraq, and Arabia.  The local Druze 
and Amil Shias themselves maintain that Maronites were immigrant tribes from  
Yemen (Salibi, 1988: 87-90). 
4.2 Neighboring Peoples
 Maronites historically lived alongside the Druze, a sect which emerged in 
the 11th century and driven, due to their heretical beliefs (Khashan, 1992: 5) , 
into the Southern Lebanon range, most likely descendants of followers of 
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Fatimid Ismaili Shias that viewed their imams as “human manifestations of 
unity with God” yet rallied around Sunni Atabegs and Turkish Mamluks (Salibi, 
1988: 13).  A historically autonomy-driven people united in their offshoot of 
Shia Islam, it was through their emirs’ rule of the Shuf range between the 17th 
and 19th centuries, with the help of the local Maronite labor force, 
administration, and international relationships that modern Lebanon would be 
conceived as an entity separate from Syria.  It was also the Druze population 
with which Maronites would come into most direct conflict with in the 19th 
century.
 By the end of the first millennium, what would become the region of 
Lebanon also became home to a large, mostly rural-dwelling Twelver Shia 
population with allegiance to various caliphates in the context of being deemed 
heretics by orthodox Sunnism.  These groups had also experienced oppression 
in the form of Sunni-led “punitive raids” in the 13th century against their heresy  
and sometimes cooperating with Crusaders (Khashan, 1992: 6).  Today, their 
historical omission from local politics is being reaped in the form of domestic 
and international power grabbing of a rising Shia population with tremendous 
grievances in response to historical regional cleavage.  During the early years of 
Maronite history in Lebanon, Shiis populated areas between Maronite and 
Druze territory, including Kisrawan, Baalbak, Bekaa, and Jabal Amil (Salibi, 
1988: 13).  Not least among the sectarian populations were the Sunni Arabs, the 
primary inhabitants of the growing city of Beirut in the early history of Lebanon 
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after the Arab invasions.  This community would have a role in local politics 
economically as well as through the administration of primarily Sunni Muslim 
ruling dynasties, from the Abbasids to the Seljuks, Mamluks, and Ottomans. 
 
 Melchites, the other main division of Arabic-speaking Christian people in 
Syria (mostly affiliated with Greek Orthodoxy), notably lived in large numbers 
in Syria and Lebanon, but particularly were less unhappy with the Islamic 
conquest, welcoming Muslims as Arab brothers.  Khashan writes that a “Sunni-
Greek Orthodox coastal coexistence resulted in a long-standing entente between 
the two communities, which recognized the Sunnis as the superior 
power” (Khashan, 1992: 6-7).  The (eventually) Roman Catholic Maronites and 
(mostly) Greek Orthodox Melchites experienced centuries of friction due to 
theological debates with underlying (and perhaps more crucial) contestation of 
loyalties with the Western and Eastern mother churches (Khashan, 1992: 6-7).  
4.3 Roman Catholic Alignment
 In 1099, the First Crusade entered into Eastern Christian and Muslim-
populated lands in Anatolia and Syria, dividing both Christian and Muslim 
communities between loyalties.  While Sunni Muslims expressed the most 
resolute opposition, Druze, Shii, as well as various Christian sects and their 
respective populations vacillated between support and opposition.  Over time 
 58
Maronite bishops and patriarchs, especially those in larger population centers, 
as well as a few of those of other Christian communities, tended towards 
welcoming the Crusaders (Salibi, 1988: 92-96).  The Maronites would find 
themselves as the only community in the Middle East to join the ranks of the 
Crusaders in full support of their mission, welcoming them with “sentiments of 
brotherly love” (Abraham, 2012: 64).  The Maronite church entered into official 
unity with the Roman Catholic church, 100 years after the crusaders’ entrance, 
through the meeting of Latin Patriarch Amaury with several pro-union 
Maronite priests (Salibi, 1988: 13).  In 1215, Pope Innocent III invited Patriarch 
Jeremiah of Amshit to the Lateran Council, where he officially dissolved the 
‘sins of disobedience’ against the Mother Church of repentant Maronite 
‘dissidents’ (Salibi, 1988: 94-97).  The decline of Frankish rule in Syria, though, 
saw increased struggles between pro and anti-union Maronites, but alignment 
with Rome would be characterize the majority of Maronite leadership into the 
contemporary era.
 Though the Mamluks’ invasion in 1291 meant the end of visits of upper-
level Roman Catholic clergy to Lebanon, the Mamluks’ cordial relationship with 
the Venitian Republic and its role in the regional spice trade led to their 
conceding to the Franciscan Lesser Brothers establishing the Terra Santa 
missions in Jerusalem and Beirut.  The presence of the Franciscan friars would 
cultivate an ideological and identity-oriented relationship with western 
Christendom in Lebanon through the years of Mamluk rule.  It was during 
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Mamluk rule that the Maronites began “to feel more keenly the advantages of 
having a Western Christian sponsor” (Salibi, 1988: 98). 
 The Maronites began to stand out among Eastern Christian communities 
by their alignment with Rome by the 15th century, while elements of Byzantium 
attempted to receive military aid from Roman Catholic armies with the 
condition of reconciling the Eastern and Western churches.  At the Council of 
Florence in 1439, initiated to unite Latin and Byzantine military power against 
Ottoman invasion, the Franciscan friars representing the Maronite cleric, John 
of Jaj, proclaimed that the Maronites would stay Frank despite the eastern 
trend towards alignment with Constantinople.  The fact that a Maronite leader 
was represented as such in the West brought Muslim sentiments against John 
of Jaj and the Maronite community as a whole, especially in Tripoli (Salibi, 
1988: 102).  In 1450, the friars of Terra Sancta were given official papal 
instruction to look after the Maronite church. Eventually, the head of the 
Maronite church would become the Patriarch of Antioch through the regional 
advocacy of the Roman Catholic church (Salibi, 1988: 75-77) as the Ottomans 
permitted Maronite patriarchs to maintain contact with Rome on the basis that 
they paid an extra tax (Salibi, 1988: 103).  
 By the 16th century, the Maronites’ affiliation with the West was clearly 
demarcated by Rome itself.  In 1510, at the beginning of Ottomon rule of 
Lebanon, Pope Leo X officially recognized the Maronites as an Eastern Christian 
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community of historical significance, “planted among a field of error” as a “rose 
among thorns” (Salibi, 1988: 72).  In 1535, Francis I and Sultan Suleiman II 
signed an agreement giving the French the right to look after the religious and 
cultural rights of the Maronites in Lebanon (Khashan, 1992: 7).  This 
relationship would last through the contemporary era, though the relationship 
with Roman Catholicism would become brokered primarily through France as 
opposed to Rome, as the leading Catholic power in Europe, by the 19th century 
(Salibi, 1988: 107).
 In 1585, after the founding of Maronite College in Rome, a small but 
steady number of Maronite men began to be sent to institutions of higher 
education, especially to Maronite College, where they would receive advanced 
western theological, linguistic, and philosophical training and to be sent back to 
their homeland as clergy and missionaries, often in Western Roman Catholic 
monastic orders such as the Jesuits or Franciscans.  Many of these leaders 
would adopt Latin names and contribute significantly to western orientalism, 
especially to understandings of the Maronites as historical defenders of Roman 
Catholic orthodoxy.  In the 18th century, schools like the Ayn Terra College in 
Kisrawan and Ayn Waraqa (originally founded as religious institutions by such 
graduates educated in western, Roman Catholic institutions) were producing 
graduates who would be leading figures in the 19th century’s Arabic literary 
revival in Beirut (Salibi, 1988: 158).  Thus, a ‘Levantine Class’, primarily 
composed of Christian Arabs but also of elite-Sunni and Shia Arab-background 
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wealthy and educated families, began to form in the Ottoman era.  This class 
was characterized by contact with trade but also political and educational 
institutions in Alexandria as well as Western Europe (Salibi, 1988: 161).
4.4 Early Sectarian Particularities
 In the 17th and 18th centuries, in the context of the Assaf Emirs’ 
welcoming Maronites to balance the Shia population (Salibi, 1988: 15; 98-100), 
Maronites began large-scale movement from the Lebanon mountain range into 
the Shuf.  Druze chieftans in that time gave land to the Maronites and their 
church in order to encourage a growing workforce for silk production.  It was 
then that Maronite Khazin sheikhs began to be appointed for leadership in the 
region, given lands and political privilege (Winslow, 1996: 17). By the end of the 
18th century, few Shias remained in the Kisrawan (Salibi, 1988: 103-106).  It 
also became a regular practice to appoint Maronites to positions of authority in 
the Shuf.  What began as a Sunni and Druze tendency to use the Maronite 
population to achieve a particular economic order and maintain a balance of 
power led to the Shihab family slowly ‘converting’ to Christianity and becoming 
Maronites (Salibi, 1988: 67).  Only Maronite Shihabs would be appointed as 
mudabbirs (administrative secretaries of the Shihabs) (Winslow, 1996: 19), and 
after around 1770, only Maronite Shihabs could be multazims of the Shuf and 
Kisrawan (Salibi, 1988: 67).  The dominance of a formerly Sunni Muslim tribe’s 
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Maronite Christian descendants over its own Sunni relatives and Druze 
neighbors is a perplexity exemplifying the political order that was developing in 
Lebanon.
 Though the name ‘Lebanon’ was used since and especially during the 
events of the Hebrew portion of the Bible, often referred to as a region with rich 
forests of cedar and white-capped mountains, it was not until the 19th century 
when the Lebanon range began to be referred to as ‘Mount Lebanon’.  It was 
also during this time that the Shihab’s iltizam (region of tax farming authority) 
was expanded to include Jabal Lubnan, the original Maronite homeland.  
Referred throughout this period as Emirs of the Druzes or Emirs of the Shuf, 
and by the 19th century as Emirs of the Lebanon (especially by foreign 
governments), it was this regional authority in the context of the local 
perplexities of governance of the mountain ranges and valleys of this western 
portion of Syria that Lebanon began to be imagined as a separate entity 
altogether in the 19th century (Salibi, 1988: 67-68).
4.5 International Involvement
 The formation of a modern Lebanon cannot be understood outside the 
scope of international involvement in the politics and social structure of the 
region.  By the 1840s, the Lebanon range and surrounding areas were referred 
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to as the Emirate of the Shihabs especially by western leaders. Klemens von 
Metternich, Chancellor of Austria, was the first to begin considering Mount 
Lebanon as distinct from Syria.  Salibi writes that “in the chanceries of Europe, 
however, as among the Maronites who outnumbered the Druzes in their own 
Kaymakamate, the former territory of Shihab Emirs continued to be regarded as 
one country” (Salibi, 1988: 68-69).  
 By the 19th century, Roman Catholic missionaries were very active in 
Syria (having successfully converted a small number of Greek Orthodox to 
Roman Catholicism, becoming Greek Catholics) (Khashan, 1992: 8), and Mount 
Lebanon was by no means excluded.  While Muslim Arabs were legally and 
socially the equivalent of the Ottomans through their adherence to orthodox 
Sunni Islam, from the standpoint of affiliation, Christian Arabs had much 
reason and a developed propensity to gravitate towards an outside source of 
social legitimacy that would take them beyond the second-class citizenship and 
unfavorable tax system.  Convenient for the Maronites, especially, was the 
ability to rely on Catholic powers.  
 At the same time, American and British protestant missionaries were 
growing in number in the region.  Syrian Protestant College, which would later 
become the American University of Beirut, was founded by American protestant 
missionaries with both a spiritual and secular educational focus.  SPC, and later 
AUB, would become a center of national thought as missionaries encouraged 
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Arabs to think of themselves as a separate nation from their Muslim Turkish 
neighbors - as Syrians or as Arabs.  Many Syrian Arabs, particularly those from 
the Greek Orthodox background (Khashan, 1992: 8), converted to Protestantism 
in a newfound spiritual and educational enlightenment and revival that would 
also birth the Arab national awakening.  It is important to note the lower 
number of Maronites converting to Protestantism, possibly due to their ability 
to align with the west through the avenue of Roman Catholicism - something 
both socially unacceptable for the Greek Orthodox, and impractical given the 
academic wealth available to all who were willing by American and British 
missionary-founded schools (this included many individuals who did not 
convert to any sect, but were nonetheless open to American and British-style 
education at new institutions).  
 While Armenian refugees of the late 19th and early 20th centuries’ 
pogroms poured into Lebanon (250,ooo were settled in Lebanon by the end of 
WWI) (Khashan, 1992: 8-9), the population of more independently-oriented 
Christians, often with some degree of Western education, increased in Lebanon 
(along with some Greek Orthodox, the Armenians would particularly choose 
political neutrality and assemble militias for the sole purpose of defense during 
the 20th century’s conflicts in Lebanon). Even individuals who did not convert 
were encouraged to attend schools, a practice that became prevalent in the 
Druze but also Sunni and Shia populations.  Significant strands of the Druze 
population were educated at missionary-founded schools and successful in 
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gaining diplomatic assistance and international advocacy from the US and UK 
during the course of the formation of modern Lebanon and Syria (Salibi, 1988: 
45-46; 130). Thus, many non-Maronite groups found opportunities for cultural 
and political alignment without the help of Roman Catholic powers.
4.6 19th Century Clashes
 The 19th century saw the beginnings of serious inter-ethnic clashes in 
Lebanon.  The Shihabs reached the height of their regional power in 1830, 
during which it had authority over two ilztizams, Sidon and Tripoli, through 
yearly muamalaa, which were re-negotiations of the iltizam with the Ottoman 
Valis of Sidon and Tripoli.  In 1818, though, the Ottoman government decreed 
new restrictions on non-Muslims, Emir Bachir (the last Shihab Sheikh of 
Lebanon) becoming more dependent on the power of the Patriarch.  Eventually, 
he was forced to crush a rebellion of Maronites that began in Antilyas, leading to 
a tense situation that pushed the bounds of his sectarian loyalty to the limit 
(Winslow, 1996: 22-23).  
 Clashes between Druze and Maronites began in 1841,  with a particularly 
bloody Druze massacre of the Maronite population (Salibi, 1988: 68), after a 
Christian was caught shooting a partridge on the land of  Druze Sheikh near 
Baaqlin (Winslow, 1996: 29).  The muamalaa ended, as did the emirate of the 
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Shihabs . During the next two decades’ build up of Maronite rebellious 
sentiment against the Druze and Druze frustration and wariness with regards to 
the Maronite population, a northern and southern ‘Kaymakamate’ was 
established, a provincial district with its own governor - the north governed by 
Maronites and the south by Druze.  These provinces proved to be extremely 
problematic in their division of land, as the north had a mixed population of 
Druze and Maronite and the south’s population of Maronites was more than 
double that of Druze (Salibi, 1988: 68-69).  
 The 1850s were characterized by a rise in Maronite “nationalist 
fervor” (Winslow, 1996: 35, 37), and a Maronite rebellion in 1858.  By 1860, 
Maronites were encouraged by their clergy to rebel against the Druze 
population.  Such clergy included Bishop of Beirut, Tubiyya Awn, who went 
against the wishes of the Patriarch and even threatened the Christians of Dayr 
al-Qamar that if they did not rise up, he would cause a need to do so.  Some 
Greek Catholic populations also showed willingness to mobilize (especially in 
the Zahleh region) (Winslow, 1996: 37).  Maronites in the Shuf began to rise up 
against the Druze in the region, leading to a pre-emptive, bloody response of 
massacre by the Druze (Salibi, 1988: 112, 114).  The Christians, led by muleteers, 
bishops, and ‘leftover’ Shihabs were less organized and effective than Druze 
forces, who also typically were allowed to enter and slaughter Christian villages 
already disarmed by the Ottoman government, which had ‘intervened’ during 
the clashes (Winslow, 1996: 38, 40).  Later in 1860, the Muslim population of 
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Damascus, aided by local soldiers, slaughtered 5,500 members of the local 
population, convincing Levantine Christians that the Ottoman government was 
sanctioning pogroms directly against the Christian population, though the 
Ottomans responded by sending Fuat Pasha, who would execute many of the 
local ‘ruffians’ accused of involvement (Winslow, 1996: 40).  French forces 
landed to put an end to the violence at the same time a conference was held in 
Beirut to discuss the reorganization of Mount Lebanon, leading to the 
‘Réglement Organique’ of 1861 (Salibi, 1988: 16), through which the 
mutesarifate of Lebanon was established as a privileged sanjak of the Ottoman 
Empire, guaranteed to be governed by an Ottoman-appointed, Western-
approved Christian governor (Salibi, 1988: 16; Winslow, 1996: 41).  Though this 
mutesarifate did not include many of the areas that would be incorporated into 
Greater Lebanon, it was a precursor to a Maronite-dominated modern Lebanon 
with a different ‘social and historical character’ than its surrounding areas, a 
‘historical homeland’ for the Christian Maronites, something that the French 
would support, but not without their own reservations regarding the potential 
response of other segments of the local population (Salibi, 1988: 25-26).
4.7 The Mandate
 In 1918, the French Mandate of Lebanon was established in the midst of 
the Arab cultural awakening, during which migrations from the Lebanese 
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countryside into Beirut became very common.  Mandates were revised and 
borders increased by Britain and France, leaving most of the former Vilayets of 
Beirut and much of the areas near Damascus to be annexed by the French, while 
Syria and Iraq went to Britain.  As the British made deals and alliances with Ibn 
Saud, the Hashemites, and the World Zionist Organization to deal with local 
rivalries in their mandated areas, the French settled in with their old 
relationship with Lebanese Maronite communities (Salibi, 1988: 17, 19).
 In September of 1920, General Henri Gouraud proclaimed the birth of 
the state of Greater Lebanon, having Beirut as its capital.  The Maronite 
community overwhelmingly supported the French presence and declaration, 
while other communities did not take any opportunity to interject at the time.  
As Arabism in many ways grew out of Beirut and spread to the entire Arab 
world in various manifestations, it was only natural that Lebanism, an 
alternative to Arabism in conceptualizing Lebanon, was also born there (Salibi, 
1988: 26).
 Though Lebanon was a new country, many of its own people clung to a 
particular vision of their own history.  With the help of France, they were able to 
establish a separate state based on this understanding of history (Salibi, 1988: 
26-28).  Through “...willing not only a separate country but also a separate 
Lebanese nationality into existence, against the wish of their neighbors and 
without the consent of people who were forced to become their 
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compatriots” (Salibi, 1988: 32), many Lebanese Christians, primarily the 
Maronites, gained an immediate political victory with grave future 
consequences.  
 In October 1918, when the French landed to oust the Arab King Faysal in 
Damascus, Maronites and other Christian waved French flags and cheered, 
welcoming France as “tender, loving mother” (Salibi, 1988: 32).  In the 
following two years, scores of Maronites were seen by Beirut’s Sunni population 
coming from the mountains and demanding an “independent Greater 
Lebanon”, and even aiding the French against the Arab King in Damascus. 
These actions would not be forgotten by the Sunnis native to Beirut.  The 
inception of the mandate’s government would be met with a Sunni boycott of 
Lebanese politics altogether, with only a handful of Sunnis becoming involved 
(including a Sunni Speaker of Parliament) and the seats in government mostly 
being filled by Maronites (Salibi, 1988: 32-35).  
 The 1923 Lausanne Treaty, between the Allies (British Empire, French 
Republic, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan, Kingdom of Greece, Kingdom of 
Romania, and Kingdom of Yugoslavia) and the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly officially mandated Syria (including Lebanon) to France, allowing the 
French to inherit decades of social infrastructure designed for their economic 
and financial benefit, mostly through the Maronite population (Winslow, 1996: 
59).  While Christians were probably a slight majority in the beginning of the 
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mandate, the French installed an extensive and deeply-rooted bureaucracy in 
Syria, with governors, councils, bureaus, and staff assigned to each state, 
including French personal and heavy favoritism for Maronite and other 
Christian involvement.  An effort to civilize characterized France’s early actions, 
to which Winslow comments that “the Crusaders had returned” (Winslow, 1996: 
62).
 When the 1925 Jebel Druze revolt broke out, Arab-identity was 
confirmed as a powerful communal attachment in the overall Sunni response 
being to support the Druze as Arab opponents to the new order instead of 
limiting the conflict to a local turf battle (Winslow, 1996: 63).  While Lebanism 
was still a possible alternative to the Druze, with their history of emirates in the 
region, and to the Shia population, which wanted to avoid Sunni dominance, 
and to the Greek Orthodox and other non-Maronite Christian groups,  all of 
these groups exhibited suspicion of Lebanism.  Many Greek Orthodox, in fact, 
contributed to the founding of the Syrian Nationalist Party (founded by Antun 
Saadeh), which served as an alternative also for Shias and Druze - a leading 
force in the idea of Syrian Arab nationalism as opposed to a greater, Sunni-
dominated pan-Arabism (Salibi, 1988: 53-54).  
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4.9 Competing Histories
 Many Lebanese Christians, encouraged by both scholars from French 
and Belgian backgrounds, as well as from their own, believed that Syria was a 
naturally demarcated territory with Beirut its historical cultural and political 
center, a historical haven for an ancient hellenistic heritage and the study of 
Roman law.  As the “vogue” of discussing Phoenicia and Lebanon’s Hellenistic, 
western, non-Arab heritage began in the 19th century, by the 1920s, a journal 
called ‘La Revue Phénicienne’ was being published in Lebanese Christian 
circles, a direct reference to the hellenistic, Phoenician, non-Arab vision of 
Lebanon that began as a trend in the 19th century and spread into the 20th 
century, the modern organization of Lebanon, and Lebanism in general (Salibi, 
1988: 171-172).  While Maronites generally viewed the founder of the precursor 
to modern Lebanon, Fakhr al-Din Maan, as a Lebanese national hero, Arabs 
viewed him as an Arab hero that opposed the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire.  
Though Sunnis could generally not subscribe to the idea of a Lebanon separate 
from other Arab countries, Shias and Druze could agree on the idea of Lebanon 
as a ‘mountain refuge’, a haven for non-Sunni dissidents, while the Sunnis 
argued that any historic oppression on the part of Sunni governments was from 
foreigners such as Seljuks, Mamluks, and Ottomans - never the fault of Sunni 
Arab (Salibi, 1988: 169-170).  
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4.9 Mandate-era Sectarian Politics and Strife
 It was to these competing visions of Lebanon that the prelude to an 
internationalized civil war found its backdrop.  Some Christian Arabs, notably 
Ignatius Mubarak, Maronite Archbishop of Beirut (Salibi, 1988: 184), and 
Patriarch Asida (Khashan, 1992: 11) even went to the point of demanding a 
Middle Eastern homeland for Christians to be established in the same way that 
Palestine was being formed as a homeland for Jews (Salibi, 1988: 184).  Civil 
strife in the 1920s often featured mainly Sunni Arabs rioting in response to 
large-scale settlement of Armenian and Assyrian refugees from Anatolia in 
Lebanon, as well as riots of praise for the success of Turkish nationalist militias’ 
forcing France out of Cilicia - both symbolic expressions of frustration with 
French rule and inter-sectarian strife.  In 1936, when Quai d’Ossay refused to 
ratify the Syrian Constitution (as was repeated in 1938 and 1939), widespread 
civil strife began to occur again (Winslow, 1996: 64). By the late 1930s, 
Maronites and Druze began expressing distinct conceptions of themselves as 
separate national entities (Khashan, 1992: 2), and Sunnis and Christians had 
begun organizing gangs and facing one another in the streets of Beirut in the 
conflict between Arabism and Lebanism.  The French Mandatory Authority in 
this time notably experienced much less opposition in areas populated by 
‘uniate’ Christians - those part of Vatican-aligned sects, including Maronite, 
Greek, and Armenian Catholics (Salibi, 1988: 64).  In 1941, the British and Free 
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French arrived in Lebanon to oust the Vichy French from newly independent 
countries (Salibi, 1988: 182-184).
 
 The formation of political parties in Lebanon began after independence, 
but the formation of parties exemplifying a democratically-oriented, non-
sectarian society proved to be increasingly elusive from the formation of the 
state.  In this era, Emil Eddé was favored by France in the elections they allowed 
in 1941, with hopes that he would help maintain France’s socio-economic order 
in Lebanon.  Bishara al Khuri emerged at the same time with a campaign 
attempting to consolidate the public opinion of all sects and push for 
independence from France with British help, which he demanded once elected 
President in 1943 (Winslow, 1996: 81-82).  In 1942, the National Bloc was 
formed, mostly of Maronites, insisting on a special treaty relationship with 
France after the fall of the Mandate.  Already in 1936, the Constitution Bloc had 
been formed with chief political strategists Michael Chiha (of a successful 
Chaldean family) and his brother-in-law Henri Pharoan (of a similarly 
prominent Greek Catholic family), composed mostly of Christians but including 
some Druze and Shiis.  This party essential believed that Lebanese 
independence would would greatly profit their represented populations 
politically and economically.  Sunni voices of a non-partisan affinity were also 
voiced in this time, particularly by such individuals as the Kazim brothers and 
Takieddine Selh, who argued that Arabism, Lebanism, Phoenecianism, and all 
other conflicting visions of what Modern Lebanon ought to form into should be 
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argued after the formation and proper running of the country.  It was in this 
season of meeting at the middle ground that the Constitution Bloc and 
cooperating Muslims agreed on the National Pact, an unwritten agreement in 
place of an actual constitution that would be referred to for decades as the 
source of political precedent and allocation of power to different sects.  This was 
understood as Muslim approval for the independence of Lebanon given its 
future commitment and sense of belonging to the greater Arab community 
(Salibi, 1988: 184-186).
4.10 The Imbalance of Independent Lebanon
 Through the National Pact, the Maronites were guaranteed the position 
of President, Directorate of Public Safety, Command of the army, as well as the 
designation of Sunday as the official sabbath day, while the Sunnis were assured 
the premiership of government - what would become the Prime Ministership.  It  
was not until after 1947 that the speakership of the parliament was assigned to 
the Shias, because the original pact did not include them.  The National Pact’s 
allocation of power set a fixed 6:5 ratio of Christian to Muslim in Parliament.  It 
was with this imbalance that Lebanon began to unravel from its foundation 
(Salibi, 1988: 186).  
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 Favoritism for the Maronites easily found its way into economic and 
market relations between sects, based on the social order established by the 
French Mandate.  Winslow writes that “Although the country had a laissez faire 
system, those who operated the economy were forced to maintain close links 
with the politicians...much of the political climate was dominated by concern 
with French intentions, with the question of Palestine, with corruption and 
possible reform, and with the ever changing personal intrigues of the 
politicians” (Winslow, 1996: 89).  Though the influx of 82,000 Palestinian 
refugees in 1948 would feed a booming economy with cheap labor, the benefits 
would largely be unnoticed by the working-class masses of Lebanon (Winslow, 
1996: 96).  In 1946, the last French Troupes pulled out of Lebanon (Winslow, 
1996: 89), but France’s influence on Lebanon’s social structure would have a 
lasting effect on regional politics and conflict into the contemporary era.  “The 
state apparatus was developed and maintained to protect the one Christian 
country of the Middle East.  Several militias had been organized to help keep the 
country Christian and separate...” (Winslow, 1996: 107).
 Other political parties were formed before and after the founding of the 
state of Lebanon, including the failed Social Democrat Party (formed in 1949) of 
the Kataeb party (the Phalange), the Maronite-dominated paramilitary force 
under the command of Pierre Gemayel, formed in 1937.  The Druze leader 
Kamal Jumblatt also attempted establishing the first non-Maronite-led leftist-
nationalist party, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), which remained 
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primarily composed of Druze.  The Syrian Nationalist Party, formed by Antun 
Saadeh in the 1930s, did include members of several sects, but failed to receive 
large-scale support in Lebanon due to its pan-Syrian agenda.  The Lebanese 
Communist Party, diverse and existing since the Mandate period, never 
succeeded in gaining any significant amount of popular approval.  Camille 
Chamoun’s opposition to Nasser’s Arab national unity movement manifested 
itself in the National Liberation Party, formed in 1958, but still mostly 
composed of Christians (Salibi, 1988: 188).
 As the new political system proved to be very pro-Christian, allocating 
especially the Maronite population with the highest concentration of power, 
Maronite leaders looked to secure their power by creating rival parties in areas 
they did not dominate.  This involved the directing of government favors to, for 
example, ‘moderate’ Druze parties in Druze-dominated areas. This only proved 
to further divisions, as more conservative opponents were polarized and 
engaged with the politics of development and modernization.  Such local powers 
attempted to maintain their tribal loyalties by preventing constitutional rule of 
law and modernization projects from reaching their constituent areas.  Loyalty 
was strengthened by blaming problems on the central government (Salibi, 1988: 
189-190).  Winslow writes that “Lebanon’s confessionalism and segmented 
society only sent independents and blocs to the parliament and these did not go 
to the public with identifiable national policies.  Their concerns were zero-sum, 
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and no single community could take a chance on policies having an overall 
impact on the country” (Winslow, 1996: 85).
 The issue of political secularism also proved to be a divisive instrument 
of sectarian tension. While Maronite leaders such as Gemayel expressed that the 
National Pact established total secularism because it declared no state religion 
for Lebanon, Muslims were still tremendously underrepresented and demanded 
some form of accommodation along the lines of their political desires.  Lebanese 
Christian society always seemed to feel particularly threatened by Muslim-
supported policy orientations, including talks with the United Arab Republic in 
1958 and 1961, and pan-Arab causes such as the 1967 Palestinian Revolution 
(Salibi, 1988: 197).  Violence in Tripoli and Beirut following the assassination of 
President on May 8, 1958 were characteristic of the tension that existed across 
sectarian lines (Winslow, 1996: 111-112).  While one side viewed the other as 
threatening a totally secular political order, the other saw a political system 
dominated by those of a different religion, and leaned toward a more 
accommodating form of secularism.  Christians, especially Maronites, viewed 
Muslims as unpatriotic pan-Arabists, while Muslims, especially Sunnis, viewed 
Christians as unpatriotic isolationists.  Imbalance continued and deepened, 
exemplified by the Christian-run Lebanese census department, which kept all 
population and demographic statistics secret (Salibi, 1988: 198).  Khashan 
describes T. Khalaf’s pinpointing of the source of Maronite cohesion as deriving 
from “cultivating solidarity of Maronite masses” and “Maintaining ideology 
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based on Western orientations and fear of Muslims” (Khashan, 1992: 12).  
Through a strong French desire to serve the interests of the Maronites in 1943, 
Muslims became politically inferior and subservient to Christians in the 
formation of the Republic of Lebanon (Khashan, 1992: 18).  
 The imbalance of modern Lebanon led to an initial climax in May 1958, 
when unknown assailants assassinated the editor of the newspaper, Al 
Telegraph.  This led to riots and the burning of the United States Information 
Agency, a response to President Chamoun’s reaching out to the US to “stand by 
to aid them if necessary” (“Beirut 1958”). President Chamoun had already 
sought to associate Nasserism with ‘communist’, as Druze and Sunni revolts 
against Chamoun were associated with Nasserism and the United Arab 
Republic, which has ambitions of extending influence into Lebanon. By labeling 
his opponents as communist, Chamoun hoped to invoke the Eisenhower 
Doctrine (Fisk, 2001: 71).  The US Marines and Army did, in fact, respond to 
such requests, beginning occupation of parts of Beirut in July, as well as 
patrolling the coast, until pulling out in October, 1958.  This event would prove 
to foreshadow future US involvement in Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil 
War, though justifications would be different from the earlier Cold War-era 
anti-communists sentiments.  The US would prove more pragmatic in the 
future, even accomplishing its interests in Lebanon through the Syrian military, 
partially funded and armed by the USSR.
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 The political arrangement leading up to the Lebanese Civil War did not 
exemplify everyones’ beliefs about how government should administer sectarian 
relationships - Greek Orthodox Archbishop Aghnatius Hazim notably rejected 
sectarian ‘cantonization’, the division and administration of a state, believing it 
to be against the essence of the Christian faith (Khashan, 1992: 19). Existing 
sectarian favoritism remained the shaky status quo less due to religious 
conviction and more due to the grouping power religious affiliation allotted. 
Salibi writes that “although the parties to the game were religious communities, 
the game itself did not involve debates on points of religion, except among the 
marginal class of the clergy who played a game which was exclusively their 
own...at the religious level, a high degree of tolerance normally prevailed...at an 
overt level, the game was a contest between different concepts of nationality for 
the country. At the covert level, tribal rivalries and jealousies were mainly 
involved...from the very start, players from outside Lebanon could easily intrude 
wherever they wished to spoil its normal course; and more often than not they 
came by actual invitation” (Salibi, 1998: 56).
4.12 Pre-War Violence
 By the end of 1973, isolated incidents of violence between militias and the 
Lebanese army were beginning to erupt into a state of war.  Food price riots of 
1973 in Tripoli and Beirut were especially instrumental in heightening tensions 
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(Winslow, 1996: 175).  By January of 1975, Israel had begun periodic raids of 
Southern Lebanon, searching for Palestinian commandos.  The issue of 
Palestinian militias in Lebanon would be a powerful catalyst toward the 
beginning of war.  Pierre Gemayel blamed Yasir Arafat and his PFLP for rockets 
being fired into a military barracks in Tyre, compromising the stability and 
authority of the Lebanese Army.  President Franjieh called for a national 
referendum involving an aggressive attitude and approval of militias’ operating 
against Palestinian militias in Lebanon.  Pierre Gemayel also called for a 
referendum on the presence of the fida’yun in Lebanon, referring to the PLO 
and affiliated Palestinian revolutionary organizations as somewhat of a second 
government and second army within Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007: 182-183). 
 In February of 1975, massive protests against Camille Chamoun’s large-
scale, high-tech fishing operations (in cooperation with Kuwaiti investors) 
began amongst local fishermen in Sidon, who felt that their traditional methods 
would never be able to compete with Chamoun’s increasingly-monopolizing 
conglomerate in the region.  The protests spiraled into road block clashes 
between the army and protestors in southern Lebanon, involving thousands of 
locals.  Winslow writes “Camille Chamoun’s company had been given the 
exclusive right to fish along the shore in South Lebanon. Did Chamoun, with his 
millions, and the Kuwaitis, with their billions, need to monopolize the coastal 
waters and put local fishermen out of business?  Why was the Lebanese army 
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firing on its own citizens when it was not even able to protect them from Israeli 
raids?” (Winslow, 1996: 182).  
 Though supporters of the emerging Lebanese National Movement (LNM) 
called for justice for those who had been killed by Lebanese soldiers in the 
protests (which was initially blocked by President Franjieh) the government 
response of transferring 2 army officers, putting the Sidon governor on 
administrative leave, and canceling the Protein project in March and April were 
too little, too late.  On April 13, 1975, militants guarding the consecration of a 
Maronite church, attended by Pierre Gemayel, got into a conflict with a car 
approaching the church, sending it away, only to be followed by the approach of 
another car shooting in the church’s direction, killing 4, including 3 Phalangists.  
Later that day, Phalangists took revenge on a bus filled with Palestinian 
refugees, killing everyone inside.  The next day, fighting began between Kataeb 
and Palestinians in Beirut.
 “Lebanon’s Christian establishment had always enjoyed an international 
status beyond its real power” (Winslow, 1996: 183).  Although some 
conservative Arab leaders in the Middle East had had their own struggles with 
Palestinians (such as King Hussein in Jordan) and could support any 
government against the ‘troubles’ that came along with their refugee 
predicament, the Lebanese army (no longer neutral) along with Maronite 
militias, took this opportunity to enter into a struggle to reestablish sectarian 
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dominance in Lebanon.  “As in 1860, the Christians, amply provoked, set out to 
defeat their enemies.  Also as in 1860, they were sure that outsiders would help 
them win the war even if they lost the battles” (Winslow, 1996: 177).
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY: WESTERN SUPPORT FOR 
MARONITE MILITIAS AND PARTIES
5.1 War Overview
 In 1975, the militia of the rightist Lebanese Kataeb Party, the leading 
party representing the Maronite political elite, had already been clashing with 
multiple militias of the Palestinian Resistance for over 5 years (Odeh, 1985: xi-
xv).  President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria looked to extend his Syrian nationalist 
and Baathist political ambitions and sphere of influence into Lebanon.  On 7 
January, President Hafiz al-Assad and Pres. Franjieh met at Shtaura, where 
Assad assured Syria's readiness to defend Lebanon against "external 
enemies" (Odeh, 1985: 139), demonstrating an avenue of support available to 
the Maronites.  Shia Militias, primarily associated with  the Amal party, became 
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involved in conflict, especially in violence targeted against parties and 
populations they viewed as furthering their political marginalization (both 
Maronite and Sunni).  The Maronite President Franjieh appointed a ‘non-
political’ Sunni to head the cabinet in the person of Nur al-Din al-Rifai.  This 
cabinet was comprised by nearly all military-leaders, which set the tone for a 
long, bloody period of war in Lebanon directed by groups of sectarian warlords.  
The cabinet included neither the Druze and Socialist leader, Kamal Jumblatt 
(PSP), who wanted to radically transform Lebanon’s power structure), nor 
Pierre Gemayel (Kataeb), who agreed to stay out as long as Jumblatt did as well 
(Winslow, 1996: 184-185).  In 1975, arms poured into the country for various 
militias to use though it seemed that cooperation was beginning to be forged.
 In the summer of 1975, while Maronite monks proposed a system of 
“independently confessional pure mini-states” to the French Envoy Couve de 
Murville, (el-Solh, 1994: 236) Sunni Sheikh Hassan Khalid called for the 
abrogation of the National Covenant (a constitutional ‘understanding’ without 
an official constitution that maintained the ratio of Christians to Muslims in 
Parliament and fixed the sects of different government appointees) and fighting 
broke out in Beirut.  Muslims complained that the army sided with the 
Christians and intervened in a Muslim-Christian conflict in Tripoli  - the killing 
of Faruk Muqaddam’s Sunni militia members.  Kamal Jumblatt called for a 
general Muslim strike on Sept 15.  For 4 days, Phalangists bombarded the main 
commercial area in Beirut.  As a response, Maronite Militias, including those of 
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Kataeb, the Maronite League (a small non-profit organization, sometimes acting 
as a militia), and the far-right Guardians of the Cedars (another small militia) 
combined to violently take on Beirut.  Prime Minister and Karami and 
‘establishment Muslims’ tried to stop the war to no avail. The Murabitun (Sunni 
Nasserist Militia) of Qulaylat took to Ras Beirut (the cosmopolitan wealthy 
residential area of western Beirut protruding into the Mediterranean) and  the 
fighting between Maronites and non-Maronite militias moved to hotel district, 
involving leftists and radicals (of various sectarian affiliations) destroying the 
city  (Winslow, 1996: 188) after ‘Black Saturday’.  
 The hotel fighting began on Saturday, 6 December, 1975, when 
Phalangists (members of Kataeb, the largest and most influential Maronite 
party throughout the war) massacred 200 civilian Muslims in response to the 
discovery of 4 dead Phalangist soldiers, leading to the LNM initiating an offense 
in the downtown Beirut hotel sector. This would be known as the ‘Battle of the 
Hotels’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 192).  When the Army attempted to recover control of 
St. Georges and Phoenicia hotels, the PLO and other Palestinian organizations 
became more heavily involved in the fighting and sects became further divided.  
It was in response to the Palestinian involvement that Franjieh and his militia 
finally officially joined the Phalangist campaign, denouncing the ‘Zionist-Leftist 
Conspiracy’ to destroy Lebanon (that is, he blamed Leftists in Lebanon and 
Zionists in Israel for the Palestinian presence in Lebanon) (Traboulsi, 2007: 
192). By November 12th, even Greek Orthodox representatives became involved 
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in the vision for Lebanon, expressing to the Papal Envoy the need for political 
reform, dialogue, and support of the PLO (Odeh, 1985: 148).
5.1.1 Sects, parties, and militias 
 Shias began to organize under Imam Musa al-Sadr, first under Harakat 
al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived) and later into militias and 
paramilitaries of Amal and Hizbollah (formed in the 1980s) which generally 
allied with opponents of Maronites because of an opposition to Maronite 
hegemony (Winslow, 1996: 197).  Shia militias were neither Nasserist nor leftist 
and often struggled against the PLO over control of Palestinian refugee camps, 
which, along with poorer areas of Lebanon and Beirut, were prime targets for 
later Iranian-supported radical Shia missionary activity and recruitment into 
militias.
 Sunni groups were generally not nationalist but rivals to the traditional 
Sunni establishment of Lebanon, which favored different levels of political 
solution with the old Maronite elites, but generally not with hard-line rightists 
like members of Kataeb.  Mustafa Saad, head of the Popular Nasserist 
Organization and the son of Maruf Saad, who was shot during fishermen’s 
strike, represented Sidon’s Sunni Arab Nationalist sentiments.  The grievance 
between the Muslims of Sidon and Chamoun’s business interests and related 
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desire for Maronite hegemony were ‘settled’ at Damour in 1976, where 
Chamoun’s forces were defeated and the former President’s villa destroyed by 
the Popular Nasserist Organization’s militia.  The Independent Nasserist 
Movement, headed by Ibrahim Qulaylat, located in West and South Beirut, 
joined the Palestinians in wiping Christians out of Beirut in March 1976.  The 
Muqaddam (October 24th Movement of Tripoli), often surrounded by Greek 
Orthodox, Maronites, Alawites, and Palestinians , spent most of its time 
working closely with Palestinians, struggling against Zgharta Maronites 
(Franjieh’s ‘Marada brigade’) and creating security problems for the Lebanese 
Army in north of Lebanon (Winslow, 1996: 198).
 Lastly, the Lebanese Front - Conservative and mostly Maronite - was led 
by Kataeb, the National Liberals (Chamoun), and Franjieh’s Zgharta/Marada 
Brigade.  The Lebanese Front’s emerging leading militia was the Lebanese 
Forces (LF), which were mostly commanded by the Gemayel family until its 
being further fragmented in the 1980s and separated from the rest of the 
Lebanese Front at different periods.  Other Maronite and non-Maronite 
Christian-affiliated militias also existed in cooperation and in opposition to the 
Lebanese Front (Winslow, 1996: 199).
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5.1.2 The beginnings of Syria’s involvement
 In early 1976, Chamoun’s Tigers (militia) and the Phalange began their 
first ‘cleansing’ of generally Christian territory in response to the al-Dhubbayah 
Palestinian Christian Refugee Camp being expelled from that area.  This 
involved aggressive encroachments against Karantina (site of massacres on 22 
January) and Maslakh Palestinian camps, to which the LNM and PLO 
responded by laying siege on Darmur on the Shuf coast. In February 1976, the 
Lebanese Arab Army was already being formed by former Lieutenant Ahmed al-
Khatib who encouraged Muslim members of the Lebanese Army to join and 
fight for control of military barracks throughout Lebanon. By this time, a 
Syrian-negotiated ceasefire had already been enforced by the PLA (Syrian-
backed Palestinian militia), which policed the ‘Green Line’ (division between 
Muslim and Christian sectors) in Beirut.  The LNM had already rejected 
President Franjieh, Prime minister Karami, and Damascus’ charter to reform 
the electoral system and political sectarianism (Traboulsi, 2007: 193-194).  With 
the emerging Lebanese Front appearing to be more aligned with Syria, and the 
US moving towards acceptance of a Syrian solution, it became convenient for 
Syria to extend itself militarily into Lebanon.
 On January 22, the Right wing (Maronite parties/militias) agreed to the 
‘Syrian Solution’ (Odeh, 1985: xi-xv), with President Franjieh meeting with 
Assad in February and agreeing to trade some reforms for Syrian promises of 
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curtailing Palestinian activities in Lebanon (Odeh, 1985: 159-160; Farris, 1994: 
22), but it wasn’t until May 31 that the invasion began.  The US’ approval of 
Syria’s intervention was especially seen in its persuading Israel to refrain from 
becoming deeply involved in Lebanon (Harris, 1997: 165).  Syrian Nationalist, 
Communist, Leftist militias rejected any notion of status quo, though Syrian 
invasion produced a separating of militias based on alignment or opposition to 
Syrian interests.  Syrian Nationalists, some Nasserist organizations, some 
Palestinian militias, Shia militias (Amal), and President Franjieh’s personal 
‘Zgharta Brigade’ cooperated with Syria while the LNM, led by the PSP’s Kamal 
Jumblatt, who acted as the leader of the interests of disenfranchised Muslims 
and Christians alike, generally conflicted with Syria.  The PSP would generally 
cooperate with the PLO and thus was mostly joined by Palestinian militias not 
aligned with Syria or those opposing a two-state solution in Israel 
(Rejectionists) (Winslow, 1996: 196). 
 Both the LNM and the Lebanese Front inherited aspects of the military 
after it largely disintegrated in 1976.  Both France and the US gave Syria 
mediation rights during Phalangist and Chamounist eradications of rebel 
holdings, though Israel competed for regional influence and Jerusalem was 
opened to a few Maronite refugees (Winslow, 1996: 196).  Hafiz al-Assad started 
sending PLA troops, under his control, to Lebanon while Syria mediated 
between Lebanese factions, tipping the balance to the Muslim side as Franjieh 
and Phalange only partially cooperated with Syria (Winslow, 1996: 202).  
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During Syrian occupation in 1976, Chamoun tried using friendly army units to 
support his Rightist cause, while Prime Minister Karami tried using loyal army 
units to maintain peace (Winslow, 1996: 203).  “Marounistan had persuaded the 
United States to get permission from Israel to allow the Syrians to intervene 
against the LNM revisionists in Lebanon” (Winslow, 1996: 204).  Syria’s 
intervention tipped the balance back to the Maronite side.
 Damascus also convinced the Arab League to assist in ‘peacekeeping’ and 
an Arab contingent was sponsored to do so.  Chamoun’s Tigers attacked the Tel 
al-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp, aided by Syria’s lifting the LNM’s siege 
around Zahleh.  The Nabaa and al-Basha camps also fell in 1976.  The 
mountains outside Beirut were also the sight of a Palestinian and LNM defense 
that was defeated by Israeli and Syrian firepower (Winslow, 1996: 209-210).  
Talks between the PLO and the Syrians ensued at at Shtaura.  These were led by 
an Arab League envoy attempting to convince President Assad, Yasir Arafat, and 
President Sarkis to talk.  At this time, Kamal Jumblatt began calling on France 
to intervene.  Though France entertained this thought, US and Kataeb 
opposition convinced her otherwise.
 On October 1, 1976, some army units joined the Phalangists in a 
Christian mountain offensive, failing to capture the town of Aley.  Still, the 
Syrians began an offensive in Sidon and opened a second front against leftist 
positions at Aley.  On 17 October, leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, 
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Lebanon, and the PLO met in Riyadh, agreeing to a 30,000-man Arab force, 
technically under President Sarkis’ control but armed by Syria, to supervise a 
truce.  This “Arab acquiescence to Syrian power in Lebanon” gave the Maronites 
the upper hand (Winslow, 1996: 210-212).  By the end of 1976, Syria replaced 
many of her forces with Palestinians in the south of Lebanon.  
5.1.3 Middle War - Syria’s Allies vs. Enemies
 The following years were characterized by struggles against Syrian 
occupation, between sects, and within sects on the part of nearly all major 
militias (though many cooperated at different times).  After 1978, turf battles 
became more prevalent.  Franjieh, Gemayel, and Chamoun’s militias fought 
each other while Amal and Hizbollah did the same (Winslow, 1996: 213).  
Concerning the sectarian nature of the war, Winslow writes that “When Kamal 
Jumblatt was murdered, the Druze reflex was to gain revenge by massacreing 
nearby Christian villages rather than punishing the Syrians who had likely 
perpetrated the deed. No mention is made of the Palestinians ‘raiding’ Khiam, a 
Muslim town, when they recaptured it from Major Haddad’s militia. But when 
they took a Christian town, Ayn Ibl, it was raided and looted.  The primordial 
attachments continued to define the struggle” (Winslow, 1996: 207).
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 From 1978-1982, Bachir Gemayel (Pierre Gemayel’s son) pursued the 
Presidency and unity of Maronite militias.  On 13 June, 1978, Bachir’s faction of 
the LF killed 34 of Franjieh’s militia, including Tony, son of Sulaiman (Winslow, 
1996: 224-225).  In May 1978, Kataeb and National Liberal Party announced 
plans to merge but started fighting 2 days later in Beirut, clashing on and off 
that summer while cooperating against Armenians and the Syrian National 
Party (Winslow, 1996: 226).  
 By 1980, Bachir Gemayel and Camille Chamoun both had multiple 
assassination attempts against them.  On July 7, 1980, Bachir’s LF overran 
Chamoun’s Tigers in Beirut in attacks against Chamoun’s headquarters, killing  
around 75 civilians.  The former president Camille Chamoun thus agreed to 
capitulate to Kataeb’s desire for a cut of his protection money.  Bachir continued 
his fight against Armenians in September 1980 in Beirut and moved on to 
taking on Zahle, building a military road towards the town but losing a 
subsequent 3 month siege to capture it (Winslow, 1996: 227-228).
5.1.4 The US and the Multinational Force: Direct 
Intervention?
 On July 25, 1981, a ceasefire agreement was brokered by Philip Habib 
(the US envoy), ending Palestinian-Israeli hostilities across the Lebanese border  
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but failing to resolve Israelis’ dilemma.  Though Palestinians kept to the 
agreement in 1981 to keep from cross-border attacks against Israel, and King 
Fahd of Saudi Arabia announced Israel’s right to exist, Israel formally annexed 
the Golan Heights on December 12, 1981, destroying the ‘spirit of Camp David’ 
and leading to a very violent 1982.  On April 10, 1982, President Sarkis asked 
the US to prevent Israeli attack.  Ambassador Samuel Lewis (US Ambassador to 
Israel) received assurances from Israeli leadership that there would be no 
attacks on Lebanese soil.  But on May 9, Israel directed air attacks on Lebanese 
targets and on May 14, Yitzak Rabin mentioned the inevitable success of Israel’s 
“military operations” in Lebanon (Winslow, 1996: 229).  The balance was again 
tipped in Lebanon, encouraging every militia to continue violence.
 By May 1982, Lebanon was completely fragmented, with Sunni and 
Alawite Baathists fighting in Tripoli, Phalangists fighting Syrians south of 
Tripoli, and Amal fighting the PLO and LNM in south and west Beirut.  
Lebanese Army units fought opposing units in Sidon; the PLO clashed with 
Saad’s Popular Nasserist Movement; south of Sidon, Amal units fought PLO-
backed Shia Communists, while Fatah fought with the Syria-supported Saiqa 
militia; a Sunni mosque was bombed in Beirut; and Syria allegedly orchestrated 
bombing of French embassy (Winslow, 1996: 230-231).  Additionally, in June, 
Syria officially began cooperation with Iranian intelligence, began encouraging 
Iran’s radicalization of Shia groups, and allowed a Revolutionary Guard 
contingent to be established in Central Bekaa (Harris, 1997: 181).
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 In June 1982, the IDF fully invaded, sieging West Beirut and cooperating 
with the Phalangists, trapping the PLO.  The PLO’s response was to destroy 
Beirut while fighting house to house with the IDF and Phalangists, threatening 
to destroy the entire city.  Bachir Gemayel won the Presidency while 800 US 
Marines were sent to assist the departure of the PLO.  The Reagan Plan, which 
was announced in the late summer of 1982, rejected Sharon’s call for Jordan to 
become a state for Palestinians and demanded a freeze on settlements in the 
West Bank and an autonomous entity assured for Palestine.  Meanwhile, 
President Assad threatened military action if Bachir Gemayel agreed to any 
peace treaty with Israel.  The fragile situation exploded, literally, with the 
bombing of Kataeb’s headquarters in East Beirut on September 14, killing 
Bachir Gemayel.  In response, 1 day after the IDF took positions around Beirut’s 
Palestinian camps, some parts of the LF (Bachir’s faction) as well as Haddad’s 
South Lebanon Army (SLA) entered the Shatila and Sabra camps and 
massacred militants and innocent civilians alike.  By September 18th, 2000 had 
been killed with the IDF in the surrounding area turning a blind eye. 
 On September 21, Amin Gemayel was elected President, promising to end 
the ‘cycle of violence’.  French and Italian troops re-entered Beirut on the 27th, 
followed by US Marines and the rest of the Multinational Force on the 28th. On 
13 October, Druze and Christian militias engaged in new clashed southeast of 
Beirut.  With Israel blamed for the massacre and foreign troops abounding 
(though officially neutral) this was an opportunity for the Maronites to come 
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back.  The new president and Security Advisor Wadie Haddad pursued a policy 
assuming a ‘blank check’ from the US (as France had assisted them in 1845 and 
1860, they hoped for the same from the Multinational Force).  No unity was 
forged between parties during this time (Winslow, 1996: 233-236).
 In December 1982, President Amin Gemayel began peace negotiations 
with Israel involving the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in hopes of a final 
victory for the Maronites.  Israel was giving arms to the Druze at the time while 
keeping from obstructing the LF’ movement into the Shuf (Druze stronghold) 
and Israeli hopes for an agreement with Amin Gemayel.  Amin Gemayel, with 
no militia of his own, reached out to the US in 1982 and 1983 but was only able 
to be provided a few tanks, training missions, and nothing more even though 
Secretary of State George Shultz, US Special Envoy Philip Habib, and US State 
Department Advisor Robert McFarlane visited Beirut often while Gemayel and 
Salem made several trips to Washington, DC (Winslow, 1996: 237-238).
 On September 1 , 1983, after months of tensions with Maronite militias 
and their cooperation with Israel, Walid Jumblatt declared a state of war with 
Gemayel’s government, leading to heavy fighting in southeast Beirut’s 
mountains involving Druze forces’ recapturing of Bhamdoun and the 
surrounded Dayr al-Qamar, leaving the Maronites trapped (similar to what 
occurred in 1845 and 1860).  Robert McFarlane ordered ships to open fire on 
Druze at Suq al-Gharb (commander of peacekeeping marines, Col. Geraghty, 
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disagreed with this), compromising US neutrality.  On October 23, days after 
President Reagan announced that the Marines would stay in Lebanon to 
maintain peace, 241 Marines were killed in a truck bombing, followed by 58 
French paratroopers killed in a 2nd bombing (all members of Multinational 
Peacekeeping Force) (Winslow, 1996: 242).  
 US forces had all left Lebanon by February 26, 1984 in line with Reagan 
officials’ confirmations that the US would no longer be seeking reconciliation.  
Major Haddad (of the SLA) died of cancer on January 14 and was replaced by 
Antoine Lahad.  Pierre Gemayel also died (of a heart attack) on August 29.  This 
was the beginning of a period of the war characterized by mostly Hizbollah-
related groups’ assassinations and kidnapping of western and non-western 
intelligence officers, diplomats, educators, journalists, and other figures.  On 
January 18, a Shia gunman assassinated Malcolm Kerr, the President of AUB.  
On March 16, CIA Station Chief William Buckley was captured and murdered. 
On May 8, Ben Weir, a longtime church leader in Lebanon, was kidnapped and 
released after 18 months in captivity. On June 23, the Australian consul was 
shot and killed while a Libyan diplomat was captured.  Though President Amin 
Gemayel opened a second reconciliation conference in Lausanne, with leaders 
from the ‘older generation’ of Lebanese elites agreeing to a ceasefire, it was clear 
that the younger leadership of their respective militias on the ground would not 
follow suit and hostilities intensified (Winslow, 1996: 245).
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5.1.5 Late War: Intercommunal Conflict
 Intracommunal conflict was very common in the last years of the civil 
war.  Maronites were split especially along geographic lines: South-Central 
Lebanon’s Maronite holdings were dominated by Dany Chamoun’s Tigers 
(taken over from his father, a decision that caused many members of Camille 
Chamoun’s National Liberal Party to oppose the party); Central Lebanon was 
dominated by the Gemayel family, but loyalty to Pierre Gemayel’s legacy verses 
that of Bachir verses those loyal to President Amin (who eventually aligned with 
Michel Aoun’s Lebanese Army) caused infighting between different factions of 
the Kataeb.  The Maronite-led SLA, in the mid-1980s especially, was partly 
soldiered by Shias and funded by Israel.  Sunni Nationalists battled Sunni 
fundamentalists in Tripoli while Sunni Nasserists fought Sunni Palestinians in 
Sidon.  Shia militias’ loyalty lay either in Syrian or Iranian support (or both) 
(Winslow, 1996: 248).  Winslow writes that “discovering which outside power 
supported which military group also seemed to defy pattern and 
purpose” (Winslow, 1996: 249).  
 One common trend in the 1980s, though, was growing Phalangist 
opposition to Syria and being assisted by Israel, especially during President 
Amin Gemayel’s presidency.  This took place while Elie Hobeika (LF) and 
former president Franjieh’s respective contingents maintained good relations 
with the Assads based on their common business interests (Winslow, 1996: 
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249).  Most of 1985 consisted of Hobeika’s pro-Syrian Phalangist wing fighting 
Samir Ja’ja’s anti-Syrian faction, Sunni militias battling each other in Sidon, 
Beirut, and Tripoli, and Hizbollah and Amal (supported by Iran and Syria, 
respectively) competing for control of South and West Beirut and Baalbek 
(Winslow, 1996: 251).  On August 29, after meeting with former Presidents Hilu 
and Chamoun, Franjieh rejected an LNM proposal to end confessionalism 
(Winslow, 1996: 254). No solution was forged in 1985.
 By 1986, the PLO was moving back into Lebanon while President Amin 
Gemayel’s indecision about an effective political solution or cooperation with 
Syria or Israel led to Syria’s taking its place in a power vacuum.  The peace 
accord of 1985 had already united Franjieh’s brigade, Hobeika’s faction, Amal, 
and the PSP in cooperation with Syria (Winslow, 1996: 255), leading to a 
massive confrontation of pro-Syrians (those above) against the Ja’ja-Gemayel 
alliance, which was able to fight off the pro-Syrians for some time.  General 
Michel Aoun’s Army brigade fought Syrian-backed PSP and other leftist groups 
in Suq al-Gharb, while Syrian troops fought al-Tawhid fundamentalists, pro-
Syrian SSNP fought Iranian-funded Hizbollah in Biqa while pro-Syrian Amal 
cooperated with Hizbollah against Palestinians.  The cooperating ended soon, 
though, especially with Amal fighting the PLO for control of the refugee camps, 
the SLA fighting leftists, Syrian nationalists, and Hizbollah (in the south), 
Christians and Muslims fighting in the Shuf, Kharrub, and Sidon, and Amal 
fighting Hizbollah in Beirut and Jabal Amil.  By 1987, Sabra and Shatila refugee 
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camps had been completely destroyed, left in a worse state than they had been 
in after the SLA and Gemayelist massacre facilitated by the IDF.  Abductions 
continued, as did many successsful and unsuccessful assassination attempts.  
On June 1, 1987, a bomb put aboard an army helicopter killed former Prime 
Minister Rashid Karami, the Sunni leader from Tripoli (Winslow, 1996: 
256-261).
 With the Cold War coming to a thaw, the US, USSR, and much of Europe 
came to several agreements having, among many things, the effect of limiting 
proxy wars.  The US especially became less wary of accepting Syrian tutelage of 
the Lebanese conflict (though they had employed it with caution on and off for 
over 10 years).  7,000 Syrian troops had already been sent to Beirut in February 
1987 to stamp out ‘camp warfare’.  It took until 1990 for Syrian troops to 
succeed in quelling the violence (Winslow, 1996: 264).  Until 1990, Syria 
continued its employment of Maronite and other militias that would cooperate 
with its goal of hegemony in turn for a piece of the political gains in the end.  
Michel Aoun’s Lebanese Army and Samir Ja’ja’s faction of the LF continued to 
oppose Syria (though they also conflicted with each other), now with the aid of 
Saddam Hussein and Iraq after the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 while  
segments of the Maronite militias (especially Franjieh’s brigade) and other 
groups continued to cooperate with Syria (Winslow, 1996: 268-270).  The 1989 
Ta’if Agreement most notably involved the US’ full endorsement of Syria’s role 
in Lebanon (Winslow, 1996: 271).  Though, according to leaders like Michel 
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Aoun, the US and France’s inaction and reliance on Syria in the end of the war 
compromised the ‘historic separation’ between ‘Christian Lebanon’ and ‘Muslim  
Syria’ (Winslow, 1996: 273), the segments of Maronite militia leaders’ reliance 
on Iraq demonstrated how cultural ties were often called upon for opportunistic 
reasons as opposed to a substantial historical precedent.  At the same time, 
Western powers’ reliance on Syria (an enemy) demonstrated the power of those 
historic ties themselves to cause one power to attempt to serve the interests of 
another indirectly.  The Syrian presence in Lebanon finally led to a conclusion 
to the majority of the violence at the cost of a domestic political solution.  The 
confessional system was reformed in many ways, notably the increase in power 
of the Prime Minister and a 50-50 ratio of Muslims to Christians in Parliament, 
but socio-economic disenfranchisement of large populations of all sects, but 
especially Shias, would lead to a completely unpredictable future in 
contemporary Lebanon. 
 Lebanon in the 1980s faced an economic stranglehold, which was a major 
contributor to the end of violence.  The removal of the PLO ended PLO deposits 
in banks and their huge local expenditures. Bank deposits between 1982 and 
1990 dropped from $12 billion to $3 billion.  Israel’s invasions were 
purposefully destructive, aimed at destroying the Lebanese economy and 
anything that the PLO could profit from.  Amin Gemayil, originally nicknamed 
‘Mr. Two Percent’ for the profits he made off of protection money and levies put 
on the majority of transactions in East Beirut, would be given the nickname ‘Mr 
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Twenty Percent’ by the end of the war.  His warlord-like profiteering was 
characteristic of nearly every leader of an armed political movement.  During 
the war years, there was practically nothing produced in Lebanon; everything 
was imported, and profit was made off of speculators trading US dollars (there 
were over 200,000 accounts in US dollars in 1988), leading to a huge 
devaluation of the Lebanese currency.  The state had very little revenue due to 
the militias extracting levies on many transactions and through protection 
money, and since what could be collected could only be collected by militias, 
militias made additional profit leaving less to be finally received by the defunct 
state (Traboulsi, 2007: 227).  Bachir Gemayel alone was responsible for 
agreeing to $1.1 billion cash in weapons purchases from the US (Traboulsi, 
2007: 228).
 Throughout the war, several illegal ports opened up to initially smuggle 
arms but later to also control trade and become economic enterprises in 
themselves. These included al-Abdeh (north), Tripoli, al-Mahdi, Shikka, 
Jouniyeh, Beirut, Uzai, Khaldeh, Jiyeh, Sidon, and Naqura.  With regards to 
Maronite militias and the pro-Maronite army, the port of Tripoli, ‘protected’ 
and controlled by Syria, was officially run by the Lebanese government; Shikka 
focused on shipping for the local cement factories connected to Franjieh’s m, 
which also protected the port, along with the SSNP and other pro-Syrian 
militias; Jouniyeh port mostly received foodstuffs for ‘Marounistan’ and a 
regular ferry to Cyprus, but it was also where Maronite militias and regular 
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forces often received weapons from the US; and the port of Beirut also received 
for the Phalange in general and LF in particular (Traboulsi, 2007: 232). 
5.2 Year-by-year case study observations for Maronites
 The historical background provides a significant backdrop to the case 
and has already included several examples of religious affiliation and indirect 
intervention.  Had this case study not been limited to the civil war years, there 
would be an endless number of observations to note regarding the two variables 
in Lebanese history.  Still, one observation is crucial to take into consideration: 
Religious affiliation is difficult to observe and identify in the span of a few years.   
Though, for example, the 19th century notion of Lebanon as a separate entity 
and haven for Syrian Christians, to be defended by western Catholic powers, is 
an instance of indirect intervention (along the lines of advocacy and diplomacy), 
its being characteristic of religious affiliation requires an understanding of 
history, specifically the 16th century unification of the Roman Catholic Church 
with the Maronite Church and the prior hundreds of years since the emergence 
of the Maronite sect.  In the same vein, indirect intervention is more observable 
as a specific event.  Western scholars’ and parliaments’ emphasis on the need 
for Lebanon to be a separate entity can be specifically observed in the 19th 
century.  Though both variables will be observed in the case study, the 
background research already indicates that the nature of the variables is 
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different, and that religious affiliation is observed as preceding and therefore 
possibly causing indirect intervention.
 As previously stated, religious affiliation and indirect intervention will be 
identified with the following characteristics:
Table 1
Religious Affiliation features all of the following:
1. Shared identification with a religious group or sub-group within a religious body
2. Members and corresponding institutions are associated (members of similar religious 
bodies and organizations) and affiliated (identified as members of the same sect).
3. Formal organizations and informal groupings based on ‘brotherhood’, both within state 
boundaries and transnationally
Table 2
Indirect Intervention is anything short of military invasion involving one or more of the 
following: 
1. Political pressure or diplomatic support on behalf of one group
2. Political legitimacy in international organizations on behalf of a group
3. Economic aid for a group
4. Funds for military supplies
5. Military equipment donations or sales
 Most importantly, since Syrian and (to a somewhat lesser extent) Israeli 
tutelage in the war were so often employed by the US and France to accomplish 
their own pro-Maronite interests, a 6th category of indirect intervention is 
added:
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Table 2.1
6. Advocating for or approval of any of the other forms of indirect intervention, as well as 
military invasion not executed by the third-party government being observed but by another 
government on behalf of a militia or party in civil war which the third-party government 
wishes to intervene on behalf of
 As described in previous section, descriptive accounts of the events 
during the war were observed and events fitting the descriptions of the variables 
have been taken note of, classified based on which of the components the 
observations involve in particular.
Table 4 1975 and 1976 year-by-year
1975 1976
5: US sent arms to Phalangists leading into 1975  
(Odeh, 1985: 131)
1: 31 March - For the purpose of Syria’s 
‘containing extremism’, US Envoy Brown 
(investigating whether and to what to 
degree there was support for Syrian 
intervention) met with Franjieh, 
Chamoun, and Gemayel; next with the 
Maronite Patriarch; last with al-Assad 
and Karami (Prime Minister) (Odeh 165)
 1: US diplomats secured P. Gemayel’s support of 
US-sponsored settlement in region (Odeh, 1985: 
131)
1, 6: 1 April - Brown communicates that 
the Christians “want the Syrians to save 
them” and brokers ‘limited’ Syrian 
involvement (Traboulsi, 2007: 196) 
US begins persuading Israel to stay out 
and let Syrians have a foothold in 
Northern Lebanon (Harris, 1997: 165);  
(Divisions emerge in LNM between 
Syrian-supported factions and those 
loyal to LNM’s causes); 
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Table 4 1975 and 1976 year-by-year
1975 1976
1: French  Envoy Couve de Murville met with 
Lebanese Maronite Order (monks), who 
proposed system of “independently  confessional 
pure mini-states” to (el-Solh, 1994: 236)
1, 6: 9 April - French Envoy met with 
Chamoun, Gemayel, and Maronite 
Patriarch to discuss presidential 
candidates; met with al-Assad, Karami, 
and Arafat afterwards; (Odeh, 1985: 
166-167); France and US disagreed on 
the nature of Syrian involvement but 
supported it nonetheless (Odeh, 1985: 
166-167)
3,4,5: Israeli arms, ammunition, and training 
given to Phalangists (Traboulsi, 2007: 195-196)
6: Syrian-controlled PLA assisted 
Phalangists in pushing LNM forces out of 
Kisrawan (Winslow, 1996: 206); US 
agreed to allow the Syrians to intervene 
on behalf of Maronite militias and 
prevent Israel from becoming involved 
(Winslow, 1996: 208)
1: Summer into Fall - US backs Sarkis for  
the Presidency with CIA using large 
amounts of money to bribe voters and 
those in charge of the process (Traboulsi 
2007, 198-199)
6: The AFL, soon to be SLA, grows with 
Israeli training, staffing, and officering 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 206-207)
Table 5 1977-1979 year-by-year
1977 1978 1979
3, 4: 8 Feb - UN SG Kurt 
Waldheim confirmed $50 million 
aid plan (mostly funded by US) 
(AP, April 29, 1976, "$20 Million 
in U.S. Aid Is Proposed for 
Lebanon")
2, 6: Syria’s role as a 
party to be supported for 
greater regional interests 
[Oct. UNSC ceasefire 
resolution implicated 
Syria as party to civil war]
(McGowen, 1989).
 6: President Sarkis and 
President Assad met in 
Damascus in 1979 to 
reassert cooperation; Syria 
would allow the ADF to stay 
in Lebanon as long as ‘Arab 
interests’ were at stake 
(McGowen, 1989)
2, 6: Syria used its influence in 
the ADF and its own army to 
maintain the balance between 
Maronite militias and PLO 
(McGowen, 1989)
1: The US did not 
communicate disapproval 
or attempt to inhibit B. 
Gemayel’s campaign 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 210)
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Table 6: 1980-1982 year-by-year
1980 1981 1982
1: The US stood between Israel 
and Syria during  the missile 
c r i s i s w h i c h B . G e m a y e l 
successfully incited, preventing 
both Syria  and Israel  from 
becoming  further engaged 
against their regional rival 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 210-211)
1: July 25 - US envoy Philip 
Habib brokered ceasefire 
agreement ending 
Palestinian-Israeli 
hostilities (Winslow, 1996: 
228)
1: April 10 - President 
Sarkis asked the US to 
prevent an Israeli attack; 
Ambassador Sam Lewis 
received assurances from 
Israel (not kept more than 1 
month) (Winslow, 1996: 
229) 
1: The US did not communicate 
disapproval or attempt to 
inhibit B. Gemayel’s campaign 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 210)
*Aug 21 - 800 US Marines 
(in  Lebanon for  the first 
time since 1958) assist the 
evacuation of Palestinian 
rebels (Winslow, 1996: 
234)
1,2: The US invited Lebanon to 
the Camp David accords as 
Sharon called for a ‘Christian 
Lebanon’ - US supported a 
‘Christian’ Lebanon (Traboulsi, 
2007: 215)
1: The Reagan Plan is 
announced (Winslow, 1996: 
234)
6: The IDF invaded with 
tacit approval  of the US 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 215)
1, 6: The US and Israel 
arranged the election of B. 
G e m a y e l  t o P r e s . 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 216)
*US Marines  evacuated 
P L O m i l i t a n t s f r o m 
Lebanon  (Traboulsi, 2007: 
216)
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Table 7: 1983-1989 year-by-year
1983 1985 1987 1988 1989
5: US only sends a 
few tanks and 
training missions  
in response to Pres. 
Amin Gemayel’s 
request for aid and 
arms (Winslow, 
1996: 237)
1 : T a c i t 
a g r e e m e n t 
b e t w e e n U S , 
Syria, and Israel: 
S. Leb. security 
l e f t t o A m a l ; 
S y r i a n  a r m y 
m o s t l y  o u t , 
except for  its 
security  officers 
left in Lebanese 
army (Traboulsi, 
2007: 225)
1, 6: Syrian 
military back 
in Lebanon 
with US’ 
approval 
(Traboulsi, 
2007: 
233-234)
6: The US fully 
encouraged 
Syrian tutelage 
in Lebanon, 
especially after 
its agreements 
with the USSR 
regarding 
proxy wars 
(Winslow, 
1996: 271)
1,6: US/Arab 
League-backed 
Taif Agreement 
brings an end 
to the conflict 
(Traboulsi, 
2007: 240)
5.2.1 Identifying Indirect Intervention in the war’s initial 
stage (1975-1976)
 In carrying out a case study of events occurring throughout the Lebanese 
Civil War, it was crucial to identify the trends of indirect intervention on behalf 
of affiliated groups already emerging at the outset of the war.  In addition, the 
context to these phenomena needed to be clarified.  Before the outset of the war, 
the historic relationship between the West and Maronite parties and militias 
culminated in US support of Maronite militias, arming in preparation for 
violent confrontation in defense of their community’s historic hegemony.  In the 
years prior to the outbreak of war in 1975, the US (usually through the CIA) sent 
periodical shipments of weapons to the Phalange (Odeh, : 131).  In addition, at a 
summit on 7 January, 1974, President Suleiman Franjieh met with President 
Hafiz al-Assad of Syria during the first visit of a Syrian President to Lebanon in 
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18 years. Among other domestic and international issues, the two discussed and 
signed a Joint Defence Treaty, granting Syria ‘early warning facilities’ in 
Lebanon against Israeli airstrikes in return for Syria’s promise to protect 
Lebanon from Israeli aggression (Traboulsi, 2007: 182).  This would be a crucial 
development in the US’ future involvement and indirect intervention in the 
Lebanese conflict.
 By september of 1974, confrontations between Phalangists and the PSP 
had already started to occur along with PSP and LNM leader, Kamal Jumblatt, 
already suspending participation of some of his ministers in the government.  
One of the ministers, Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, had accused President Franjieh of 
covering up another shipment of arms at the port of Jounieh, unloaded by the 
Lebanese army but distributed to Maronite militias.  It was relationships like 
this, reflective of the Maronites’ past relationship with France and Roman 
Catholicism, but by the 1970s much more often involving the US, which would 
lay the backdrop for US support of Maronite militias.  In fact, in 1975, the 
Lebanese Maronite Order proposed a system of “independently confessional 
pure mini-states” to French Envoy Couve de Murville (el-Solh, 1994: 236) to no 
avail.  Also, perhaps due to major changes in its international involvement after 
the second Vatican Council, such as being much more focused in international 
dialogue instead of maintaining its own political order (“Why is Vatican II so 
important?”) , the Vatican and international Roman Catholicism were rarely 
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observed as siding strongly with the Maronites from a military point of view, 
while the US seemed to be taking over this sort of role.   
 While in 1975 Amal, the Shia Militia, was created as the armed wing of 
the Movement of the Deprived, the initial conflict was primarily between the 
Leftist and generally Muslim alliance of Druze, Sunni and Shia Muslims, mostly 
Greek Orthodox communists, Syrian nationalists, and Armenians not involved 
in their own communities militias (which were overwhelmingly neutral through 
most of the course of the war).  Non-Maronite Christian peoples often found 
themselves on both sides of the inaccurately-labeled struggle between 
Christians and Muslims.  In fact, the political ambivalence of Greek Orthodox 
Arab, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, 
Protestant, and other communities illustrated how it was not religious belief 
influencing policy but the convenience of religious affiliation and the channels 
of cooperation it made available. Phalangist recruiting often targeted 
neighborhoods in predominantly Christian East Beirut, where the Armenian 
neighborhoods were also located, Armenian families living on the outskirts of a 
neighborhood might find themselves pressured to allow their sons to join the 
Phalangists in order to avoid pressure against the family and to gain local 
standing.  Joining a very locally-recruiting militia was often not much of a 
choice but something unavoidable. Other Armenians and Greek Orthodox Arabs 
ideologically found themselves sometimes more aligned with Syrian 
nationalism, especially if they had familial connections to cities in Syria; or with 
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the Palestinian struggle, had they relatives in Palestine or had they descended 
from Palestine themselves.
 Still, it was largely through the lens of a conflict between Christian and 
Muslim that the United States saw the ensuing conflict in Lebanon.  The 
Lebanese Army shooting of protesters during the February 1975 strike against 
the Protein fishing company, which Camille Chamoun held a large stake in and 
was heavily connected with the government (Traboulsi, 2007: 182-183; 
Winslow, 1996: 198), was responded to by a Maronite-led counterstrike and 
demonstrations in Beirut and Sidon (Traboulsi, 2007: 183).  The 13 April, 1975 
shooting on the Maronite congregation in al Rumaneh, responded to by the 
Phalange bus shooting and killing of 21 Palestinians on a bus headed towards 
the Tel al-Zatar camp, helped to furnish sectarian lines and distinguish the 
available recipients of Western aid to the conflict (Traboulsi, 2007: 183). 
  As the lines were drawn between the LNM and PLO and the Army, 
Phalangists, Tigers, and Zgharta Militia, the Christian side stressed its critique 
of the LNM as a welcomer of outside forces (specifically the PLO) which 
undermined Lebanese sovereignty (Traboulsi, 2007: 187-188), while the loosely 
Leftist side labeled their enemies as isolationists.  Neither accusation was 
completely accurate; the PLO had found its new base in Lebanon and had 
become very much local and unwanted in much of the Arab world, while the 
Phalange and its allies were heavily supported by outside powers to oppose the 
LNM’s proposed reforms (e.g. the ‘transitional programme for democratic 
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reform of the Lebanese system’) and Palestinian influence in Lebanon 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 188-189). It was during 1975 that US diplomats entertained 
the idea of a their own peace plan for the region, which was accepted by Pierre 
Gemayel (Odeh, 1985: 131), and in 1976 that the US investigated and decided to 
employ a Syrian military presence to impose a peace.
 In November, 1975, Prime Minister Karami shut down the government in 
protest of another shipment of arms that was received by the Army at Jounieh 
to be delivered to Phalangists  (Traboulsi, 2007: 192).  The supply of weapons, 
from outside supporters, to the one-sided army, delivered to the Maronite 
militias was not an uncommon way of receiving support for any of the militias in 
Lebanon, but it was nonetheless a clear demonstration of indirect intervention 
and how the lines were drawn between sides in Lebanon at this time.  By the 
time of ‘Black Saturday’, though the ‘Muslim’ and ‘Christian’ sides were 
becoming increasingly polarized, Shia militias had yet to fully form and the 
most prominent leader of the Shia community, Musa al-Sadr, maintained 
support of the President until late 1975 or 1976, along with Al-Nahar and other 
pro-Syrian forces (Traboulsi, 2007: 192).
 By the spring, though President al-Assad had met with Jumblatt (who 
pled for help in achieving his desired reforms), Syria had pledged its 
commitment to President Franjieh, the Phalange, and the Lebanese status quo 
(Odeh, 1985: 139).  US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in 1973, had already 
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taken note of how Syria was crucial to peace in the Middle East, famously 
stating that ‘there can be no war in the Middle East without Egypt and no peace 
without Syria’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 195). The US administration had already been 
praising Syria’s ‘positive’ role in Lebanon in January 1976. Though, in March, 
Kissinger was still questioning the nature of Syria’s role in Lebanon and sent his 
Special Emissary Dean Brown to seek peace but to keep Syria out (Traboulsi, 
2007: 195-196).  This was especially due to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s 
informing the US that Israeli forces would have to slip into southern Lebanon to 
protect their ‘red line’ that Syrian forces were not to cross in the event of a 
Syrian military presence in Lebanon.  The US wanted to avoid confrontation 
between Israel and Syria and thus wanted to keep Syria out of Lebanon 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 195).  On 31 March, US envoy Brown met with President 
Franjieh, Camille Chamoun, and Pierre Gemayel first and later in the day with 
the Maronite patriarch, and, lastly, President al-Assad and Karami (Odeh, 1985: 
165). 
 The US’ interests in the Maronite population seemed to be clearly 
displayed in a 1 April report by Brown to his superiors, in which he specified 
that the Christians ‘want the Syrians to save them’, implying that the best way to 
defend the Lebanese Christian population (or, Lebanese Maronite hegemony) 
was to do so through Syria. Though certain allies of the Phalange, such as 
Camille Chamoun, hoped for direct intervention on the part of the US, domestic 
constraints, Franjieh and most of the Phalange’s leadership’s approval of the 
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‘Syrian solution’, and the convenience of Syria’s possible tutelage in Lebanon led 
to US approval of Syrian involvement.  Brown brokered a ‘limited’ Syrian 
involvement in Lebanon, which opened the door to nearly 30 years of Syrian 
occupation (Traboulsi, 2007: 196). In April, President al-Assad would even call 
the LNM “criminals who buy and sell revolution” while initiating the first stages 
of Syria’s military occupation with tanks crossing the border into Lebanon 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 195-196). It was at this time that, while Secretary of State 
Kissinger continued with the rhetoric that implied the US’ mere tolerance of 
Syrian involvement for the purpose of “curbing extremism”, the Phalange 
welcomed the role of Syria, as well as the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) which 
would be sent into Lebanon (Odeh, 1985: 164-165).
 The military presence of a government bordering Lebanon available to 
the Maronites as well as to the US (which sought a way to influence the crisis in 
Lebanon) was not limited only to Syria.  In September 1975, George Adwan 
(leader of Al-Tanzim, the secret network of rightist, mostly Maronite militia 
leaders) and Daniel Kimche (coordinator of Mosad’s activities in Lebanon) met 
at the Israeli Embassy of France.  This was followed by a meeting in Jounieh 
including Kimche, Colonel bin-Elezier, Pierre and Bachir Gemayel; another 
meeting with the two Israelis and Camille and Dany Chamoun; and a final 
meeting including Prime Minister Rabin himself along with Chamoun and 
Gemayel on an Israeli Navy boat off the Lebanese coast.  These meetings led to 
the Israelis agreeing to provide arms, ammunitions, and training to the 
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Phalange, while they were not led to intervene directly in Lebanon.  Bachir 
Gemayel would send a Phalange delegate  American diplomats were cognizant 
of this relationship and also approached management of the Lebanese conflict 
through Israel.  Though Colonel Elezier and other Israeli military officials would 
even attend the siege of Tel al-Zatar camp (the blame of which would often be 
put on the Israelis), the US focused on Syria as a means of invading without 
having to invade themselves (in fact, the Syria military was largely funded by 
the USSR, so the US would also be able to avoid much of the costs of direct 
intervention).
 At this point, the US is observed as the primary Western broker of power 
in Lebanon, seemingly open and closing floodgates of governments and 
militaries for its own interests. A country like France, with its historic 
relationship with Maronite Lebanon, by the 1970s was much less influential in 
world politics after the demise of its global imperial strongholds in the mid 20th 
century.  Henry Kissinger’s memoirs corresponding to this period of time 
include his mentioning how the US “encouraged Israel to serve as arms supplier 
of the Christians even while Syria was acting-temporarily at least-as their 
protector” (Traboulsi, 2007: 197).  Here we find the beginning of the US 
mediating the dialogue of deterrence between Syria, which opposed Israeli 
occupation of Lebanon, and Israel, which also desired to minimize Syria’s 
influence especially with regards to their policy towards Palestinians and usage 
of the Palestinian militia they funded (Traboulsi, 2007: 197-198).  France, too, 
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welcomed a diplomatic meeting with President al-Assad in Paris, finally 
agreeing to their involvement in Lebanon (Odeh, 1985:166-167).
 The US would go on to backing Ilyas Sarkis for President in the 
upcoming 1976 election with the Sa’iqa Syrian-backed Palestinian military 
faction guarding the election and proceedings. Both Saudi Arabia and the CIA 
would actually spend a considerable amount of money buying votes for that 
election.  Around 20 MPs, mostly Jumblatt’s allies, then boycotted the election. 
By this time, the Lebanese Army was rivaled by the Lebanese Arab Army, while 
the Tel al-Zatar camp, the hotels in downtown Beirut, the Beirut-Damascus 
road, and key Phalange strongholds in the interior of Lebanon were aggressively  
attacked by the LNM until the large-scale Syrian occupation officially began on 1  
June, beginning with 6,000 soldiers but reaching 15,000. This would be fiercely 
opposed by the LNM and PLO but impossible to stop (Traboulsi, 2007: 
198-199).  
 The growing divide, at this point, could be understood as being between 
the ‘left’ and ‘right’, Muslim and Christian blocs, Arabist and Lebanese, anti-
Syrian and pro-Syrian, US-opposed and US-backed, and many other divisions. 
The importance of the US-Maronite relationship, however, is crucially observed 
in this study as an avenue of indirect support.  Still, we find actors working 
against this relationship.  Beginning in the summer of 1976, Bachir Gemayel, 
the ambitious son of warlord and Kataeb leader, Pierre Gemayel, began meeting 
secretly with Kamal Jumblatt, plotting to gain an advantage in the balance of 
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power against the will of the political bloc he belonged to.  He would go on to 
being the only Maronite leader to join in Kamal Jumblatt’s compromise, 
attacking traditional political leaders of Lebanon and the bourgeoise that left 
East Beirut during the beginning of the war, leaving the poor to defend 
Christian territory and fight the ‘battle of the hotels’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 200-201).   
During the 1980s, he would speak out against the US’ lack of support for his 
‘cause’, claiming that he had been fighting against Syria and the Palestinians all 
along with the only legitimate cause in Lebanon ("Bachir Gemayel Interview"), 
while interviews with Dany Chamoun and Camille Chamoun portrayed them as 
leaders of the bloc but also struggling against the same enemy. 
 This portrayal as well as Syria’s relationship with the USSR (the 
announcement of 6,000 Syrian soldiers being sent to Lebanon in early June was 
made in the presence of the Soviet Prime Minister during his visit to Damascus) 
possibly blurs the lines dividing the sides in the war, but the fact that the US was 
willing to accept and use Syria’s presence in Lebanon to support the Maronite 
cause further illustrates the power of their affiliation with that group in Lebanon 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 199).  It counters the argument that the US was merely 
interested in supporting the Maronites because of their anti-communist stance 
(though this was a stance popularly employed by Maronite leaders themselves) 
or that the US was merely paving the way for Israeli interests in Lebanon (since 
Israel was the greatest proponent of a non-Israeli solution for the Palestinian 
population ‘problem’).  The US wavered on who it worked with to defend what 
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were understood as Maronite and Christian interests, especially since this 
required balancing Syrian and Israeli desires to achieve their respective regional 
goals, but the common denominator was a consistent vouching for ‘Christian’ 
Lebanon, even when its leaders would go back and forth on who they were 
willing to cooperate with.
 The summer of 1976, though still early in the war, is when differences in 
the Maronite bloc begin to demonstrate the pragmatism with which the western 
supporters of Maronite leadership, primarily the US, sought to send along 
support.  Bachir Gemayel’s secret meetings with Kamal Jumblatt had led to a 
large compromise, including acceptance of the PLO presence and certain 
reforms requested by Jumblatt - reforms that showed a drastic change in 
Bachir’s mindset, pointing to power-grabbing ambitions.  In the movement 
toward Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel was accepting a truce and becoming more 
aligned against Syria.  Since the US had chosen to allow Syria to intervene in the 
conflict, there could not be direct support for Bachir Gemayel’s ambitious 
efforts.  In the meantime, Kamal Jumblatt, including France as one of his many 
foreign diplomatic visits, attempted to gain French favor for his cause. Though 
members of the French Left opposition to Mitterrand, he was informed that, as 
long as the US and Syria (with their own self-supported Palestinian groups, 
including DFLP and PFLP) opposed Jumblatt, his PSP and militias, and his 
allies in Lebanon (including the PLO and other anti-Syrian Palestinian militias), 
there could be no French support (Traboulsi, 2007: 201).
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 US support through Syria continued on behalf of those loyal to President 
Franjieh and, in the fall of 1976, the new President Sarkis.  In the summer of 
1976, the Israeli military also began, with US permission, to extend itself into 
southern Lebanon, opening the ‘good frontier’ in south Lebanon and helping 
dissident Major Saad Haddad and his Lebanese army dissidents to form the 
Army of Free Lebanon, which, after coming to include members of Shia and 
Druze militias in the south, became known as the South Lebanon Army (SLA). 
The SLA would, in future months and years, be funded, armed, and even 
officered by Israel.  While the Phalange hoped that their and Israel’s support of 
a new militia in the south would push Palestinian militias towards disarmament 
(in the spirit of the Camp David accords), and the PLO called for a break of 
relations between the Lebanese Front and Israel, the Lebanese Front and Syria 
had a falling out.  The Maronite leadership had hoped that, by the summer’s 
Syrian occupation, Palestinian militias would have begun to be disarmed. This 
was not the case, and Israel thus became more of an available source of support 
for leaders seeking Maronite hegemony (Traboulsi, 2007: 206-207).
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Table 4 1975 and 1976 year-by-year
1975 1976
5: US sent arms to Phalangists leading into 1975  
(Odeh, 1985: 131; Traboulsi)
1: 31 March - For the purpose of Syria’s 
‘containing extremism’, US Envoy Brown 
(investigating whether and to what to 
degree there was support for Syrian 
intervention) met with Franjieh, 
Chamoun, and Gemayel; next with the 
Maronite Patriarch; last with al-Assad 
and Karami (Prime Minister) (Odeh 165)
 1: US diplomats secured P. Gemayel’s support of 
US-sponsored settlement in region (Odeh, 1985: 
131)
1, 6: 1 April - Brown communicates that 
the Christians “want the Syrians to save 
them” and brokers ‘limited’ Syrian 
involvement (Traboulsi, 2007: 196) 
US begins persuading Israel to stay out 
and let Syrians have a foothold in 
Northern Lebanon (Harris, 1997: 165);  
(Divisions emerge in LNM between 
Syrian-supported factions and those 
loyal to LNM’s causes); 
1: French  Envoy Couve de Murville met with 
Lebanese Maronite Order (monks), who 
proposed system of “independently  confessional 
pure mini-states” to (el-Solh, 1994: 236)
1, 6: 9 April - French Envoy met with 
Chamoun, Gemayel, and Maronite 
Patriarch to discuss presidential 
candidates; met with al-Assad, Karami, 
and Arafat afterwards; (Odeh, 1985: 
166-167); France and US disagreed on 
the nature of Syrian involvement but 
supported it nonetheless (Odeh, 1985: 
166-167)
3,4,5: Israeli arms, ammunition, and training 
given to Phalangists (Traboulsi, 2007: 195-196)
6: Syrian-controlled PLA assisted 
Phalangists in pushing LNM forces out of 
Kisrawan (Winslow, 1996: 206); US 
agreed to allow the Syrians to intervene 
on behalf of Maronite militias and 
prevent Israel from becoming involved 
(Winslow, 1996: 208)
1: Summer into Fall - US backs Sarkis for  
the Presidency with CIA using large 
amounts of money to bribe voters and 
those in charge of the process (Traboulsi 
2007, 198-199)
6: The AFL, soon to be SLA, grows with 
Israeli training, staffing, and officering 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 206-207)
1. Political  pressure  or  diplomatic  support  on  behalf  of  one group; 2. Political  legitimacy  in international 
organizations on behalf of  a group; 3. Economic  aid for  a group; 4. Funds for  military  supplies; 5. Military 
equipment  donations or  sales; 6. Advocating for  or  approval  of  any  of  the  other  forms of  indirect  intervention, as 
well  as military  invasion, not  executed by  the third-party  government  being observed but  by  another  government 
on behalf of a militia or party in civil war which the third-party government wishes to intervene on behalf of
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5.2.2 The rise of Bachir Gemayel and ambition for ‘Christian’ 
hegemony (1977-1982)
 At this point, it is difficult to identify who and which political 
organizations would serve the interests of the Maronite population most.  In 
1977, with the ADF helping to keep the more anti-establishment, anti-Phalange 
parties at bay (McGowen, 1989), President Sarkis began a push towards giving 
Bachir Gemayel a dominant role in a future government, while Bachir began his 
own 1,000-strong militia, soon known as the Lebanese Forces (LF) (Traboulsi, 
2007: 207-208).  Meanwhile, around $20 million in aid was promised to 
Lebanon, to be received mostly by the army and the Phalange ("$20 Million in 
U.S. Aid is Proposed for Lebanon"), while Syrian tutelage becamse more 
internationally legitimized in 1978 through the international community, 
particularly the UN Security Council, considering Syria a party to the Lebanese 
civil war. In addition, in 1979, President Sarkis and President al-Assad met to 
reassert the cooperation between the Syrian military and the ADF in Lebanon, 
as long as ‘Arab interests’ were at stake (McGowen, 1989). 
 In northern Lebanon, the former President Franjieh and his Marada 
brigade clashed with Phalangists over local pushes to incorporate Franjieh’s 
spheres of influence (his hometown was in Zgharta), while Franjieh and his 
militia resisted and chose to continue alignment with Syria and its presence in 
Lebanon.  After the killing of Suleiman Franjieh’s son, Tony, and his wife and 
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daughter in an attack on Suleiman’s villa in northern Lebanon, the rift in the 
Maronite leadership was accentuated.  The Marada would cooperate in the 
north with the SSNP’s (Syrian Social Nationalist Party) militia, the religiously-
mixed pro-Syrian party.  Bachir and his men began to confront the Syrian 
presence, along with the Chamouns’ Tigers militia, taking over all of East Beirut 
(including Armenian Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant communities’ 
neighborhoods, whose independent leadership and militias were blamed for 
their neutral stance and refusal to pay protection money). by 1980 and going on 
to incorporate the majority Greek Catholic city of Zahleh into its sphere of 
influence (Traboulsi, 2007: 210).
 By pushing on into Zahleh, Bachir Gemayel was also successful in 
creating a sort of ‘missile crisis’ between Syria and Israel, in which 2 Syria 
helicopters transporting troops to Zahleh were shot down by Israeli fighters.  In 
response, Syria placed 3 surface-to-air missiles in the Biqa valley, as well as a 
few other long-rage missiles in Lebanon near the Syrian border, aimed at Israel.  
This crisis was then mediated by Philip Habib, the Lebanese-background US 
diplomat and personal envoy of President Reagan.  The crisis was ended with 
the US standing in the middle of both Israel and Syria, with the common 
denominator of a desired favorable position for the Phalange at stake.  This was 
accomplished by the LF being forced to leave Zahleh but the Syrian army being 
forbidden from taking the LF’s place there (Traboulsi, 2007: 210-211).
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 By the end of 1980, Bachir Gemayel was setting up to take power as 
somewhat of a military dictator, backed by then-president Sarkis and the ‘study 
for seizure of power by Bachir, which was a plan drafted in September 1980 by 
Lieutenant Colonel Michel Aoun and Antoine Najm, a philosophy teacher and 
Phalangist ideologue.  This plan ensured that a five-region federalist system, 
assuring LF control over the richest areas and considerable influence over the 
rest, and was followed up in 1980 by a plan, drafted by Karim Pakradoni and 
Joseph Abu Khalil, calling for a federation to officially replace the 1926 
constitution.  This settlement attracted the support of an increasingly ambitious 
Iraq, promising aid money to the LF.  Traboulsi writes that “Christian Lebanon 
was sold to the US ambassador as a second Israel with all the benefits for the 
USA of the first, minus its inconveniences (meaning that it would be accepted 
by the Arab world)” (Traboulsi, 2007: 212).  Here we can see a result of the 
advantageous position involvement in Lebanon gave the US.
 In July 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin allowed for a ceasefire 
with the PLO on the Lebanese border after Israel experienced heavy damage in 
Upper Galilee inflicted by the PLO.  This was negotiated by Philip Habib and 
Yasir Arafat, another case of US involvement in the regional conflict.  In March 
1980, the Americans had already invited Lebanon to join in the Camp David 
accords, going along with Ariel Sharon’s vision for a ‘Christian’ Lebanon under 
Bachir, an Israeli West bank, and a Palestinian Jordan.  Though this seemed 
favorable to Maronites desiring a hegemonic order in Lebanon, and to Israelis 
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desiring a final place for Palestinians, apart from Palestine, the impracticality of 
such a plan in the face of such strong opposition in Lebanon could only come 
from strong incentive on the part of the US. 
 Though US Ambassador (to Israel) Sam Lewis received assurances from 
Israel that there would be no invasion (Winslow, 1996:229), on 6 June, 1982, 
the IDF began its full invasion, reaching and encircling the Baabda presidential 
palace outside Beirut, would follow through on Begin’s promise to Bachir 
(affirmed by Habib): “I’ll make you president” (Traboulsi, 2007: 215).   In the 
meantime, the Reagan Plan was announced, soon followed by the arrival of 800 
US Marines, on Lebanese soil for the first time since 1958, sent to assist in the 
evacuation of the PLO (Winslow, 1996: 234).  In this context, the IDF’s tanks 
protected the military barracks in which Bachir was sworn in.  In his meetings 
with Israeli officials as newly-elected president, Bachir Gemayel, advised by the 
US, would ask for 6-9 months to establish his authority. He did not agree to a 
peace treaty, which evidently was also not something the US pressured him to 
agree to, and Israel continued its new occupation of Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007: 
216).  Bachir was soon assassinated (on 14 September, 1982), days after the 
inauguration, after which the massacres at Sabra and Shatila occurred 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 218).
 It is crucial to specify the involvement in the massacre.  According to the 
testimony of US Secretary of State George Shultz, Ariel Sharon had clarified that 
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he had initially asked the Lebanese army to “clean them out...they can kill the 
terrorists. But if they don’t we will” (Traboulsi, 2007: 218).  An Israeli 
reconnaissance force was the first to enter the camps on the 15th, having already  
assassinated 3 PLO leaders in Beirut early that week.  They were followed, on 
the 16th, by Saad Haddad’s segment of the South Lebanon Army, which was 
attached to Israeli forces in Beirut, and Elie Hobeika’s ‘Apaches’, a security 
segment of the LF, which was led by Marun Mashalani, Michel Zuwayn, and 
Georges Melko.  Incidentally, the US peacekeeping force had been pulled out of 
Lebanon (having aided in the removal of all PLO fighters) hastily, before its 30 
day mandate, leaving many innocent Palestinians in the camps.  This is an 
instance in which US cooperation with the Maronites through the Israelis led to 
tremendous bloodshed and questions of intent. Leaders like Haddad and 
Hobeika would need to work in future years to remove their being associated 
with massacres at Sabra and Shatila from their reputations, blaming it on the 
Israelis.  The US marines were sent back in response to this crisis, and would 
arrive by 28 September along with the rest of the Multinational Force (MNF), 
which also included French and Italian troops (Traboulsi, 2007: 219) (Winslow, 
1996: 235).
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5.2.3 The ambition of Amin Gemayel, foreign direct 
intervention (1982-1983)
 The newly elected Amin Gemayel, brother of Bachir, would in the next 
several months use the US marines presence not as security or a deterrent but a 
way to go on the offensive against his Muslim enemies, though he was unable to 
secure much arms or funding from the US (which seemed to be focused on 
accomplishing security goals themselves), only receiving a few tanks and 
training missions (Winslow, 1996: 237).  The new LF commander, Fadi Frem, 
led his troops into the Shuf to assert the area’s ‘Christian’ identity (Traboulsi, 
2007: 220), and Amin sent police to poor Muslim (Palestinian, Lebanese Shiia, 
etc.) settlements in South Beirut to clear out ‘illegal squatters’.  
 This sort of activity went on for several months, into 1983, when Amin 
Gemayel ordered the Lebanese army to occupy West Beirut (primarily Sunni) 
and its southern suburbs (Palestinian and Shia).  Coincidentally, as this form of 
‘Christian nationalism’ was sweeping across Lebanon, the anti-Israeli and anti-
Phalangist Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) was formed in 1982, 
serving as an umbrella for ex-LNM organizations and parties. These especially 
included the Lebanese Communist Party (mostly consisting of Lebanese from 
disenfranchised Christian groups, such as Arab Greek Orthodox and Armenian 
Orthodox and Catholics) and the Organization for Communist Action (primarily  
Shia but mixed with various Christian groups), and the Socialist Arab Action 
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Party (another mixed party). While Amin, following in his brother’s footsteps, 
attempted to ‘Christianize’ Lebanon, Christians and members of other sects rose 
against this, demonstrating the paradox of the vision for any Lebanese sect’s 
‘hegemony’ and the lack of any real service provided to Lebanese Christians by 
US involvement (Traboulsi, 2007: 221).  
Table 5 1977-1979 year-by-year
1977 1978 1979
3, 4: 8 Feb - UN SG Kurt 
Waldheim confirmed $50 million 
aid plan (mostly funded by US) 
("$20 Million in U.S. Aid is 
Proposed for Lebanon")
2, 6: Syria’s role as a 
party to be supported for 
greater regional interests 
[Oct. UNSC ceasefire 
resolution implicated 
Syria as party to civil war]
(McGowen, 1989).
 6: President Sarkis and 
President Assad met in 
Damascus in 1979 to 
reassert cooperation; Syria 
would allow the ADF to stay 
in Lebanon as long as ‘Arab 
interests’ were at stake 
(McGowen, 1989)
2, 6: Syria used its influence in 
the ADF and its own army to 
maintain the balance between 
Maronite militias and PLO 
(McGowen, 1989)
1: The US did not 
communicate disapproval 
or attempt to inhibit B. 
Gemayel’s campaign 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 210)
1. Political  pressure or  diplomatic support on behalf of one group; 2. Political  legitimacy  in 
international  organizations on  behalf of  a group; 3. Economic aid for a  group; 4. Funds for 
military supplies; 5. Military equipment donations or sales; 6. Advocating for or approval  of any 
of the other  forms of indirect  intervention, as  well  as military  invasion, not executed by  the 
third-party government being observed but  by  another government on behalf  of  a  militia or 
party in civil war which the third-party government wishes to intervene on behalf of
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Table 6: 1980-1982 year-by-year
1980 1981 1982
1: The US stood between Israel 
and Syria during  the missile 
c r i s i s w h i c h B . G e m a y e l 
successfully incited, preventing 
both Syria  and Israel  from 
becoming  further engaged 
against their regional rival 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 210-211)
1: July 25 - US envoy Philip 
Habib brokered ceasefire 
agreement ending 
Palestinian-Israeli 
hostilities (Winslow, 1996: 
228)
1: April 10 - President 
Sarkis asked the US to 
prevent an Israeli attack; 
Ambassador Sam Lewis 
received assurances from 
Israel (not kept more than 1 
month) (Winslow, 1996: 
229) 
1: The US did not communicate 
disapproval or attempt to 
inhibit B. Gemayel’s campaign 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 210)
*Aug 21 - 800 US Marines 
(in  Lebanon for  the first 
time since 1958) assist the 
evacuation of Palestinian 
rebels (Winslow, 1996: 
234)
1,2: The US invited Lebanon to 
the Camp David accords as 
Sharon called for a ‘Christian 
Lebanon’ - US supported a 
‘Christian’ Lebanon (Traboulsi, 
2007: 215)
1: The Reagan Plan is 
announced (Winslow, 1996: 
234)
6: The IDF invaded with 
tacit approval  of the US 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 215)
1, 6: The US and Israel 
arranged the election of B. 
G e m a y e l  t o P r e s . 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 216)
*US Marines  evacuated 
P L O m i l i t a n t s f r o m 
Lebanon  (Traboulsi, 2007: 
216)
1. Political  pressure or  diplomatic support on behalf of one group; 2. Political  legitimacy  in 
international  organizations on  behalf of  a group; 3. Economic aid for a  group; 4. Funds for 
military supplies; 5. Military equipment donations or sales; 6. Advocating for or approval  of any 
of the other  forms of indirect  intervention, as  well  as military  invasion, not executed by  the 
third-party government being observed but  by  another government on behalf  of  a  militia or 
party in civil war which the third-party government wishes to intervene on behalf of
 
 The LNRF continued part of the resistance that the LNM initiated, which 
was also continued by the National Salvation Front (NSF), encompassing other 
former LNM members, the PLO, Amal, Rashid Karami, and Suleiman Franjieh.  
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The NSF traveled to Damascus in early 1983 to become part of Syria’s counter-
offensive.  At the same time, rising radicalism and prevalence of suicide 
bombings of Hizbollah, the rival of the more pro-establishment Amal 
movement, began to frighten the occupation forces (Traboulsi, 2007: 222).  The 
presence of the Multinational Force (MNF) and peace talks between Amin and 
Sharon were all reasons for radicals to further radicalize and make desperate 
attempts to assert force (Traboulsi, 2007: 224).  The 1983 Geneva conference, 
held shortly after the 17 May peace accord between Sharon and Amin (which 
Syria complained to US Secretary of State George Shultz of being a ‘pact of 
domination’, was held to foster talks between Jumblatt, Birri, Chamoun, and 
Gemayil, ending with the designation of Karami as Prime Minister.  This loose 
cooperation did not last very long after the fall 1983 bombings and early 1984 
pullout of the MNF (Traboulsi, 2007: 225).
5.2.4 Signs of peace, near settlement, no peace until Taif 
agreement (1984-1990)
 1984 was the year, though, of a short ‘national unity’ and coexistence 
between the Phalange and the NSF.  On 17 February, 1985, the last Israeli forces 
withdrew from Sidon, Beirut, and the Beirut-Damascus Road, staying only to 
patrol the southern border areas.  A tacit agreement existed between between 
the US, Israel, and Syria, allowing for Israel to entrust security in southern 
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Lebanon to Amal, which agreed to take on an anti-Palestinian stance, especially 
in the camp warfare of 1984-1985.  The agreement also included Syria’s 
agreeing to pull troops out of the western portion of the Biqa Valley, though 
loyal Lebanese army units were allowed to remain staffed by Syrian intelligence 
officers (Traboulsi, 2007: 225).
 At this time, another break within the Phalange would lead to another 
aim of support for the US, though the years immediately following the barracks 
bombing were characterized by reservation and wariness of involvement on the 
part of the US.  On 28 December, 1985, a tripartite agreement between 
Jumblatt, Birri, and Elie Hobeika arranged a peace accord promising an end to 
the war, dissolution of all militias within one year, Christian-Muslim parity in 
parliamentary representation, abolition of political sectarianism, and limited 
presidential (Maronite) powers in favor of the prime minister (Sunni muslim) 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 226).  This was opposed by Amin Gemayel, who complained 
to Damascus in January 1986 meetings that the arrangement was unfair 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 227).  On 12 March, 1986, Amin Gemayel and Samir Jaja 
engineered a coup and ouster of Hobeika’s faction of the LF from ‘Marounistan’, 
ending the agreement and allowing the war to drag on until 1990 (Traboulsi, 
2007: 227). It would feature a return of a large-scale Syrian presence in early 
1987, Shiia sectarian infighting (between Amal and Hizbollah), fighting between 
Amal and the PLO, Amal and the former LNM (PSP, LNRF, NSF), LF and 
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Phalange, Jaja and Hobeika’s respetive LF factions, and between the LF and the 
Lebanese military units loyal to General Aoun (Traboulsi, 2007: 233-234).  
 
 The Taif Agreement, the fruit of a US-backed Arab League initiative 
which giving the Sunni Prime Minister increased power and did not advocate 
for the removal of the Syrian military presence, signed by Lebanese 
parliamentarians on 22 October 1989 in the context of increasing Syrian-
American rapprochement, allowed Syria to launch a final assault to dislodge the 
dissident, self-proclaimed leader of Christian Lebanon, General Michel Aoun 
from the Baabda presidential palace.  Aoun had received large amounts of aid 
from Sadam Hussein and Iraq during his 2 year campaign to redeem Bachir 
Gemayel’s hegemonic ambitions.  Aoun would take refuge in the French 
Embassy until being exiled to France in 1991 (Traboulsi, 2007: 240).
Table 6: 1983-1989 year-by-year
1983 1985 1987 1988 1989
5: US only sends a 
few tanks and 
training missions  in 
response to Pres. 
Amin Gemayel’s 
request for aid and 
arms (Winslow, 
1996: 237)
1 : T a c i t 
a g r e e m e n t 
between US, 
S y r i a , a n d 
Israel: S. Leb. 
security  left to 
Amal; Syrian 
army mostly 
out, except for 
i t s  s e c u r i t y 
officers left in 
Lebanese army 
( T r a b o u l s i , 
2007: 225)
1, 6: Syrian 
military back 
in Lebanon 
with US’ 
approval 
(Traboulsi, 
2007: 
233-234)
6: The US fully 
encouraged 
Syrian tutelage 
in Lebanon, 
especially after 
its agreements 
with the USSR 
regarding 
proxy wars 
(Winslow, 
1996: 271)
1,6: US/Arab 
League-backed 
Taif Agreement 
brings an end 
to the conflict 
(Traboulsi, 
2007: 240)
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 1. Political pressure or diplomatic support on behalf of one group; 2. Political legitimacy in 
international organizations on behalf of a group; 3. Economic aid for a group; 4. Funds for 
military supplies; 5. Military equipment donations or sales; 6. Advocating for or approval of any 
of the other forms of indirect intervention, as well as military invasion, not executed by the 
third-party government being observed but by another government on behalf of a militia or 
party in civil war which the third-party government wishes to intervene on behalf of
5.3 Observations
 39 observations of indirect intervention of the US or France on behalf of 
Maronite parties and militias were made in the 16-year case study. 30/39 
occurred before the US, France, and other western powers intervened, placing 
forces on the ground in Lebanon in the summer of 1982.  Out of all the 
observations from the 16-year case study, 17 out of 39 (44%) involved (type 1) 
political pressure or diplomatic support; 12 out of  39 (31%) involved (type 6) 
advocating for or approval of any of the other forms of indirect intervention, as 
well as military invasion, executed by another government; 3 out of 39 (8%) 
involved (type 2) political legitimacy in international organizations on behalf of 
a group; 3 out of 39 (8%) involved (type 5) military equipment donations or 
sales; 2 out of 39 (5%) involved (type 3) economic aid for a group; and 2 out of 
39 (5%) involved (type 4) funds for military supplies.
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 Figure 1
 
 It is crucial to note the decrease in and forms of indirect intervention 
after the failed intervention in 1982, which ended after US ‘neutrality’ was 
‘compromised’ with US forces firing at Druze forces too close for comfort to the 
US ambassador’s residence.  This ignited the rising Shia radical groups’ (led by 
Hizbollah) devastating bombing of the US Marine barracks and French 
paratroopers.  Though indirect intervention by way of religiously affiliated 
relationships pinned the US and France as pro-Maronite, direct intervention 
sent a clear signal to other parties and militias who the west was backing.  This 
observation is to be taken into consideration in future studies regarding the 
effects of direct intervention, and how bias in conflict intervention can exist if it 
is in the context of semi-covert support.
6. Advocating for or approval of intervention of another government
31%
5. Military equipment donations or sales
8%
4. Funds for military supplies
5%
3. Economic aid 
5%
2. Political legitimacy in international organizations
8%
1. Political pressure or diplomatic support
44%
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 The most frequently employed form of indirect intervention, diplomatic 
or political pressure, was mostly used when the second most frequently used 
form, approval of another government’s intervention, was also used.  The US 
and France’s accepting Syria’s role in managing the conflict generally resulted 
from a desire to maintain order without having to intervene themselves. Israeli 
security interests were also managed this way.  The US would frequently work to 
diplomatically balance leaders of Syria and Israel while seeking the interests of 
Maronite leaders through both countries’ involvement in Lebanon.  Indirect 
intervention by a third-party that wishes to aid a religiously-affiliated group 
within a civil war (in this case, the US looking to aid the Phalange and Lebanese 
government) does not necessarily involve aiding the groups of interest.  It 
seemed that both the US and France, though they looked to serve Maronite 
interests, felt that they had a better idea of how to serve those interests than to 
constantly aid militias.  Funds and weapons were therefore not allocated as 
often as was Syrian and Israeli involvement or staving off Syria and Israel from 
becoming too involved.  
 The US would also vacillate between the recipients of their aid.  At times, 
it seemed that the ambitious Bachir Gemayel was losing his grip on US support 
with his rejection of the Syrian presence, mixed relationship with Israel, and 
bloody campaign to dominate Lebanon.  Still, though they would turn to figures 
such as President Sarkis and back to Bachir Gemayel again, there existed a 
constant move towards supporting the interests of the Maronite establishment.  
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US diplomats and even Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were willing to see 
both Israel and Syria kept at a distance from Maronite areas but also, when the 
time called for it, to see them exert brutal force on the countryside and its cities.  
The common denominator of the US’, and to a lesser extent France’s loyalty 
seemed to be directed toward the Maronites, who represented to western 
powers ‘Christian’ Lebanon (though there were many other Christian sects and 
ethnicities in Lebanon with various local and international loyalties, and mostly 
lack thereof).
5.4 Process Tracing: Making sense of the observations
 The result of the process of the case was the final Syrian solution and Taif 
accords adopted in 1989, which in itself is a form of indirect intervention on the 
part of the US and France, resulting because of their advocacy of Syrian military  
occupation of Lebanon.  Though this arose out of the context of the last years of 
the Cold War, during which the USSR and US decreased their involvement in 
proxy wars tremendously, it is a policy continued from years past.  The US 
reverted to relying on Syrian tutelage after its failed intervention, along with 
French and other western countries’ armed forces, in 1982, before which  aid in 
the form of diplomatic and political pressure and advocacy (the most 
prominently-used form of indirect intervention), and the donation of military 
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supplies (the first-used form of indirect intervention in the war) preceded and 
laid the backdrop to the affiliation-based relationship of indirect intervention.
 Based on the process traced above in which religious affiliation precedes 
and leads to a chain reaction of forms of indirect intervention, the following 
emerges as a broad hypothesis:
Religious affiliation, which develops through shared religious organizations, 
cultural and educational exchange, political legitimacy, and military cooperation 
leads to military sale and donations to similarly-affiliated groups (whether 
governmental or private or militia) which, in the event of civil war, leads to a 
chain of forms of indirect intervention, primarily involving diplomacy and 
political pressure and advocacy, but also likely leading to and including other 
governments’ intervention (of any form) on behalf of the favored group.  This 
country, at the resolution of the conflict, will likely have a favorable and 
hegemonic position in the intervened country as well as the region.
 
 The following pre-hypotheses emerge:
1. Shared religious organizations, cultural and educational exchange, political 
legitimacy, and military cooperation lead to religious affiliation 
2. Religiously affiliated parties engage in military sale and donations to groups 
(whether governmental or private or militia)
3. In the event of civil war, this military relationship becomes indirect 
intervention, primarily involving diplomacy and political pressure and 
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advocacy, but also likely leading to and including other governments’ 
intervention (of any form) on behalf of the favored group.  
 Since a causal relationship can be identified through process tracing, the 
final hypothesis x: Religious affiliation -> y: Indirect Intervention
can be tested in future large-n studies by creating data sets of all religiously-
affiliated parties and militias involved in civil war and whether they receive 
indirect intervention.  For a contribution to the study of conflict intervention in 
the Middle East specifically, this can be a data set compiling events since the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of modern nation states and mandates 
in the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
 This thesis generates the testable hypothesis which argues that religious 
affiliation leads third-party governments to intervene indirectly on behalf of 
similarly affiliated parties and militias engaged in civil war.  It examines 
literature on the role of religion in international politics, emphasizing the social 
phenomenon of transnational religious affiliation.  In a further examination of 
literature discussing ethnic and religious groups in conflict, the phenomenon of 
indirect intervention is synthesized from a number of descriptions of forms of 
intervention. It is found in the literature that this type of intervention has been 
found to be used by religiously-affiliated third-parties.  The two variables, 
religious affiliation and indirect intervention, are examined in a hypothesis-
generating case study, one which does not begin with a hypothesis to be tested 
but with variables whose causal relationship is to be hypothesized.  The case 
chosen is the Lebanese Civil War, specifically the indirect intervention of 
Western powers, mostly the United States but also France, on behalf of 
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Maronite Arab militias, parties, and overall hegemony.  This case is chosen 
because of the richness of perspectives Lebanon offers to all religious, ethnic, 
and sectarian cleavages in the Middle East, as well as in the world.  It is also 
specifically the role of ‘Christian affiliation’ that is examined in order to study 
religious affiliation as a broad phenomenon, identifying trends and behavior 
characteristic of religion as a social phenomenon in general and not focusing 
only on political Islam.  It is crucial to understand religious affiliation as a broad 
phenomenon in order to differentiate in future studies between what is purely 
characteristic of religious affiliation, a universal phenomenon, and that which is 
a product of particular religious beliefs, which change from case to case.
 The literature review begins with a broad discussion of literature on the 
role of religion in international politics, including citations of Kulbakova 
(2000), with crucial contributions to the understanding of religion in society, 
and Katzenstein (2007), whose perspective on both religion and secularism in 
society adds crucial dimensions to a study relating to the topic.  Viewing religion 
as a social phenomenon, as Philpott (2007) suggests doing, especially 
considering how most of Walker Connor’s (1978) discussed forms of identity are 
in some way related to religion, leads to the observation that such phenomena 
cross state and ethno-national boundaries.  Transnational religious affiliation 
can thus understood as one form of what Seul (1999) describes as the “hidden 
logic” between identity and conflict.  Other terms referring to seemingly the 
same phenomenon, such as ‘affinity’, often used by Connor (1978), and ‘ethnic 
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brethren’, used in many sources including Carment et al (2006) in a discussion 
of “groups that believe they are threatened may seek out support from their 
ethnic brethren” and how similar groups expend resources “on behalf of ethnic 
brethren”.  Both of these terminologies are found in essence in ‘religious 
affiliation’, which is used because of its power to describe both attraction to 
other members of the same group and the sense of brotherhood or solidarity felt 
between groups across borders.  Thus, the first contribution of the literature 
review is its emphasis and reiteration of religious affiliation as a useful way to 
discuss the relationships between ‘religious brethren’ with ‘affinity’ for each 
other across state boundaries.
 This literature review then finds itself engaging with conflict intervention 
literature, especially given studies similar to Carment et al (2006), which stress 
the propensity of similarly-affiliated groups to assist each other, especially in 
the event of conflict.  In recent decades, religious affiliation has been a prevalent 
feature of civil conflicts in which third-parties have potentially sought to 
intervene in, and potential interveners have often been affiliated with groups 
within the civil war. This has included the US and its involvement with 
Christian leaders in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, Russia’s support of 
Orthodox Christian Serbs in the former Yugoslavia through the 1990s, and 
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s support of Sunni and Shia groups, respectively, in 
conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa in the 1990s and 2000s.  The 
existence of such “emotional ties” creating “feelings of affinity and responsibility  
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for oppressed kindred living elsewhere, motivating a state to intervene on their 
behalf” (Fox, James, Li, 2009: 164) led this study to examine, specifically, the 
forms of intervention associated with religious affiliation.
 Reagan (1996) establishes that, according to the examination of a rich 
data set of third-party interventions, interventions on the behalf of state-centers 
in civil wars succeeded far more often than those on behalf of opposition 
groups.  Why would it be, though, that a third-party government would 
intervene on behalf of an opposition group or a minority in a civil war?  This 
thesis first suggests that religious affiliation is one strong motivation for 
intervening for a similarly-affiliated group, whether it is related to a state-center  
or is an opposition group.  It also goes further to ask what kind intervention 
religiously affiliated groups are led to execute on the behalf of others.
 The literature review arrives at a need for further understanding of what 
Carment, James, and Li (2009) describe as “providing funds for military 
supplies, direct military equipment donations or sales, providing military 
training”, and other forms of intervention which do not involve directly 
invading and occupying a foreign territory, which seem commonly pursued for 
the sake of religiously-affiliated groups.  Though the literature on third-party 
conflict intervention touches upon a differentiation between military occupation 
and other forms of intervention, it usually classifies intervention from a 
qualitative point of view (that is, whether the intervention involves the military 
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or military supplies, it is still considered military intervention) rather than by 
differentiating what this thesis differentiates as direct and indirect intervention.  
Given the observation that existing religious, organizational and ecumenical 
relationships likely have the ability to foster international cooperation in the 
event of conflict, the variable indirect intervention is described as a synthesis of 
various forms of intervention that come short of direct military invasion.  The 
second contribution of the literature review, then, is the defining of indirect 
intervention.
 With a focus on these two variables, the thesis realizes a need to match 
intuitive understandings in the literature with additional empirical evidence.  
The fact that empirical evidence to be sought would be dealing with newly 
synthesized variables necessitates examining a real-world case involving 
religious affiliation and indirect intervention.  It was decided to pursue a 
hypothesis-generating case study, involving process tracing of the existence of 
variables in their historical context in order to propose a hypothesis that could 
be tested in future studies involving large-N data sets and correlations meant to 
strengthen the proposed causal relationship.  This thesis was meant primarily to 
begin a study of the relationship between religious affiliation, previously 
understood but underemphasized, and indirect intervention, a newly-
synthesized variable.
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 Regarding the case choice, a case in the Middle East was chosen for three 
reasons: 1) It is a local where the historic dimensions of religious belief and 
grouping are in constant internationalized conflict, 2) the rise of the power of 
Islamism in the world demands a case to be considered involving the cultural 
context of Islam, and 3) it is of particular interest to a student of the relations 
between the US and countries in the Middle East.  
 A case involving the US was sought for the sake of having the study’s 
results applicable directly to US foreign policy making, which makes crucial 
decisions that effect local and regional dynamics in the Middle East.  Choosing 
the US, though, made it difficult to find a case in which the US was drawn to 
intervention for reasons related to religious affiliation.  For that purpose, the 
US’ role in supporting parties, militia, and armies in the Lebanese Civil War was 
chosen because of the apparent relationship between the majority Christian US 
and some of the Christian segments of the Lebanese population.  Lastly, it is of 
great value to the the field of international relations in general and studies of 
ethnicity and religion in conflict in particular to find the commonalities between 
religious affiliation of various forms, avoiding studies that capture issues 
particular to one sect or religion.  Studies in Islamic jurisprudence or Christian 
political theology are largely limited to understanding a particular belief’s 
relationship with international politics, whereas a study which looks to observe 
an aspect of religion as a broad social phenomenon provides valuable insight 
into religious affiliation and avoids a discussion of religious belief.  Religions 
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may be quite different, but religious affiliation manifests itself in common and 
parallel ways in diverse contexts.
 Religious Affiliation is defined in a way which avoids being considered a 
pure manifestation of religious practice.  Works such as Singer (1963); Varshney  
(1998); Fox (1999b); Fox (2002); Varshney (2002); Gabriel, Appleby and Sivan 
(2003); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Lemke and Regan (2004); Wilkinson 
(2004); Fox (2004c); Birnir (2007); Chandra and Wilkinson (2008); Birnir et al 
(2011); Birnir and Satana (2013); Satana et al (2013) all point to how religion 
itself does not encourage conflict, though it effectively serves to provide 
convenient administrative and social avenues by which a leading group of 
individuals with shared identity. It is important to view religious affiliation in 
this sense, which involves both structure and sentiment but lacks religion itself 
(which is too broad a concept to be isolated into one variable) and religious 
belief (which is not consistently proven to be a primary cause of conflict).
 ‘Indirect’ is a limited term which may imply a lack of confrontation at all, 
though it is meant in this study to isolate forms of intervention other than 
military invasion.  It is used for the purpose of consistency in this study, but any  
future study based on this work will use more specific terminology which does 
not rule out diplomacy. Diplomacy is intuitively direct in that it is neither secret 
nor done far from the conflict. For future studies to discuss what this study 
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refers to as ‘indirect intervention’, a more accurate term which describes the 
non-invasive nature of such intervention will be synthesized.
 In the case of the Lebanese Civil War, limited to a study of the years from 
1975-1990, a year-by-year observation of historical accounts and identification 
of instances of indirect intervention (established as any of the following 1. 
Political pressure or diplomatic support on behalf of one group; 2. Political 
legitimacy in international organizations on behalf of a group; 3. Economic aid 
for a group; 4. Funds for military supplies; 5. Military equipment donations or 
sales; 6. Advocating for or approval of any of the other forms of indirect 
intervention, as well as military invasion, not executed by the third-party 
government being observed but by another government on behalf of a militia or 
party in civil war which the third-party government wishes to intervene on 
behalf of) served to illustrate how the US (and to a lesser extent, France), as 
majority-Christian third-parties to the civil war, involved themselves in funding, 
training, providing political and diplomatic pressure, and even approving other 
states’ direct military occupation (i.e. Syria and Israel) on behalf of Maronite 
Arab militias, regular units, political parties, and factions in the Lebanese 
government, for the sake of preserving a Christian-dominated Lebanese 
political system at the cost of the political representation of Shiite, Sunni, Druze, 
and minority Christian Lebanese citizens and Palestinians in Lebanon.  
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 The case in particular adds a significant contribution to the possible 
forms of indirect intervention. This is in the last form of indirect intervention 
listed: Advocating for or approval of any of the other forms of indirect 
intervention, as well as military invasion, not executed by the third-party 
government being observed but by another government on behalf of a militia or 
party in civil war which the third-party government wishes to intervene on 
behalf of.  Most frequently, the US used its diplomatic relationship with Syria 
and Israel to balance those states’ regional security goals and preferences, 
advocating for the advantaged position of Maronite leaders and political parties.
 In addition to the overall hypothesis that suggests religious affiliation as 
a cause of indirect intervention, this last contribution of a third-party indirectly 
arranging for intervention in a civil war, to be executed by another third-party, 
is a form of intervention in need of thorough consideration in contemporary 
international politics.  In the late summer and early fall of 2013, President 
Barack Obama and US military leaders, facing congressional and international 
pressure for and against intervention, decided not to become directly involved 
in the civil war in Syria.  Still, the US’ relationship with Syria cannot be 
understood as non-intervention.  The US’ relationship with groups in Syria 
needs to be examined, with the possibility that militant groups and political 
parties are being aided by the US.  Given the last form of indirect intervention 
which the hypothesis-generating study on the Lebanese Civil War yielded, the 
US’ relationship with other countries that are willing to directly and indirectly 
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intervene need also be considered, especially given that several bordering 
governments are of similar religious affiliation to groups in Syria.  The 
government of Iran, identified with Shia Islam, openly supports the Shia-
affiliated al-Assad family and the al-Assad-run government, while it is often 
reported that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States provide aid to Sunni-affiliated 
groups, which often enter Syria through Sunni-affiliated Turkey.
 Finally, this thesis presents a research agenda that needs to be 
undertaken in order to understand whether religious affiliation causes indirect 
intervention.  With a focus on the Middle East and North Africa from the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire through the beginning of the 21st century, a series of 
qualitative studies of every regional conflict in this span of time needs first to be 
compiled.  Second, the features of each conflict and whether the internal 
fractures are along the lines of religious affiliation needs to be confirmed.  
Third, each conflict needs to be examined to identify the existence of third-party  
intervention.  Fourth, it needs to be established whether each third-party 
intervener is religiously affiliated to groups in the target country’s civil war.  
Fifth, the form of intervention needs to be identified.  Large-N studies 
identifying correlation between conflicts with internal divisions along 
religiously-affiliated lines and those involving indirect intervention would either 
display trends proving or disproving the hypothesis.  Confirming this 
hypothetical relationship would help to understand the past and anticipate the 
future in cases involving religious affiliation and indirect intervention.
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APPENDIX 
Outline of major non-neutral groups  
Bold = Syria-backed  Italic = Israel-backed Green
Party/Militia Size 
(thousa
nds)
Majority Goals
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) 30 Reform
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) 2.5 Druze Reform; Arabism
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) 2-5 Greek Orthodox Radical Reform
Communist Action Organization 2 Shia Radical Reform; Shia
Independent Nasserists/Sentinels 3 Muslim Reform; Arabism
Syrian Baathists 3 Muslim Syria
Iraqi Baathists 3 Muslim Iraq
Syrian  Socialist Nationalist  Party 
(SSNP)
3 Greek Orthodox Reform; Syria
LNM Government (Lebanese Arab 
Army)
4 Sunni Reform; Arabism
a l - T a w h i d ( I s l a m i c U n i f i c a t i o n 
Movement)
1 Sunni Sunni
Divisions of  Victory  (Union of 
Toiling Peoples’ Forces)
1 Nasserism
Amal 1.5 Shia Reform; Shia
Hizbollah (officially founded 1985) 1+ Shia Radical Reform; Shia
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Lebanese Front 30
Phalangists/Lebanese Forces 
(LKP/Kataeb Party) (Lebanese 
Forces)
3 Maronite Federalism
Zgharta Brigade (Franjieh’s Militia) 3 Maronite Maronite (regional); Reform
NLP  (National  Liberal  Party/Tigers 
Militia)
0.5 Maronite Federalism
SLA 2.5 Maronite Anti-Palestinian
Guardians of the Cedars 0.5 Maronite Federalism
Al Tanzim 0.2 Maronite Federalism
Lebanese Army (after desertions) 10 Maronite Maronite
Palestinians (including  those in other 
militias)
25 Mixed Muslim Palestine
Palestinian  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO)
Mixed Muslim Palestine
Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA ) Mixed Muslim Rejectionist
Fatah Mixed Muslim Palestine
Popular  Front for  the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Mixed Rejectionist
DFLP Mixed Rejectionist
Saiqa Mixed Muslim Rejectionist
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Map 1 - Adapted from Traboulsi (2007: 188) 188 The Wars of Lebanon
being punished by isolation (`azl)! That slogan only led to increasing 
the infl uence of the Phalange among the Christian public.
As the Christian ministers resigned in solidarity with the Phalange, 
Sulh presented his government’s resignation in an accusatory speech 
against the Phalange during a turbulent session of parliament. 
Franjiyeh’s reaction expressed his inability to manage a crisis on 
which he had lost all infl uence. On 23 May, he named a military 
cabinet headed by a retired army offi cer, Brigadier-General Nur al-
Din al-Rifa`i, charged with ‘establishing law and order’. This stillborn 
military government resigned three days later under pressure from a 
general strike called by the LNM and backed by the Muslim political 
community along with Raymond Iddi and a number of Christian 
fi gures. Franjiyeh promptly made an about-face and asked Rashid 
Karami to form a new government. Karami’s government, composed 
of six ministers excluding both the Phalange and Junblat, but 
Map 5 Beirut in the civil war 1975–76
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Map 2 - Adapted from Traboulsi (2007: 241)
Postscript 241
Map 6 Sectarian representation of parliamentary seats since Ta’if
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